Declining Predation during Development
A Feedback Process
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9720825 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Carlos Bethencourt (0000-0002-5605-9576, Universidad de La Laguna), Fernando Perera‐Tallo (Universidad de La Laguna) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 326 |
| Pages | 253-294 |
| Publication date | 2015-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12105 |
| OpenAlex | W2167086656 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 38 |
Empirical evidence suggests that poorer countries have larger amounts of predation. We formulate a neoclassical growth model in which agents devote time to either produce or predate. When the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is lower than one, the labour share rises with capital, reducing the incentive to predate and increasing the incentive to produce throughout the transition. Consequently, a feedback process between capital accumulation and predation arises, which amplifies income differences generated by differences in productivity. This paper helps to explain why differences between countries have remained stable and the key role that institutions play in development
Biology · Capital (architecture) · Capital accumulation · Economics · Elasticity of substitution · Empirical evidence · Human capital · Incentive · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Predation · Production (economics) · Productivity · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Ecology · Economic Growth and Development · Economic Growth and Productivity
Predation, Efficiency, and Inequality
Empirics for Growth and Distribution
Reward structures and the allocation of talent
What have we learned from a decade of empirical research on growth? It's Not Factor Accumulation
The new comparative economics
The Allocation of Talent
Workers, Warriors, and Criminals
The Voracity Effect
Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth
Who Are The Microenterprise Owners? Evidence From Sri Lanka On Tokman V. De Soto
The cross-country pattern of corruption
The Aggregate Burden of Crime
The causes of corruption
Factor Substitution and Factor-Augmenting Technical Progress in the United States
Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality
Do Institutions Cause Growth
Getting Income Shares Right
Twin Peaks
Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others
Do Institutions Cause Growth
The Economic Lives of the Poor
| Highly cited | No |
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