The Impossibility of a Just Liberal
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9720960 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jerry S Kelly (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 169 |
| Pages | 67 |
| Publication date | 1976-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2553017 |
| OpenAlex | W2028388131 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 3 |
In literature that tries to find a way around difficulties suggested by Arrow's (1963) Impossibility Theorem, one strand has taken issue with nature of domain of social welfare function (and often, at same time, with independence of irrelevant alternatives). Arrow assumed that a social preference ordering was to be obtained by examining only individuals' (ordinal) preferences over social states. But several authors have suggested that, in doing so, he has excluded possibility of making use of certain kinds of information that might aid us in making good social choices. A common remark is that, in this restricted format, Arrow ignores issues of intensity of preference. This is raised, for example, by Phelps (1973, p. 19), who relates this issue to the matter of whether preferences are to be supposed representable by an ordinal utility function or instead by a cardinal utility function. However, simply seeing a difficulty in one of Arrow's conditions does not solve problem, as those conditions were sufficient, not necessary, for revealing difficulties in social choice. Phelps continues: It appears to have been proven by Sen [1970b], however, that representability of individual preferences in terms of cardinal utility does not suffice to dispel Arrow's impossibility result. Another variant of this theme suggests that Arrow's framework ignores information available from extended sympathy. Arrow himself (1963, p. 114; 1967) raises this issue in talking about English tombstone carving
Arrow · Arrow's impossibility theorem · Economics · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Impossibility · Independence of irrelevant alternatives · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Social choice theory · Social welfare function · Sympathy · Welfare · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
Rights and the Private Pareto Principle
On Weights and Measures
Class, Gender and Other Groups
The Demands of Equality
Poverty and Affluence
Freedom, Achievement and Resources
Functionings and Capability
Justice and Capability
Introduction Questions and Themes
Freedom, Agency and Well‐Being
Welfare Economics and Inequality
Justice, liberty, unanimity and the axioms of identity
Justice-constrained libertarian claims and Pareto efficient collective decisions
Equality of What?
The Possibility of Democratic Pluralism
On the Consistency of Libertarian Values
Liberty, Unanimity and Rights
Preference Formation and the Axioms of Choice
Inequality Reexamined
Equity, efficiency and rights in social choice
| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,4 |
| Citation span | 1976 - 2001 (26) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |