Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Swiss Auctions

Bibliographic Data

ID9721246
AuthorsThomas Von Ungern‐sternberg (corresponding author), Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg
Year1991
Volume58
Issue231
Pages341
Publication date1991-08-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2554821
OpenAlexW4240963983
LanguageEN

This paper studies a model of simultaneous sealed-bid multiobject auctions where the designated winner has the possibility of withdrawing his bid. It is shown that, when the bidders face rising marginal costs (a capacity constraint), the introduction of such a withdrawal option may lead to lower equilibrium prices. Furthermore, an increase in the slope of the marginal cost curve may lead to lower equilibrium prices

Business · Common value auction · Economics · Microeconomics · Merger and Competition Analysis

Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae