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Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

Bibliographic Data

ID9723598
AuthorsWolfgang Buchholz (University of Regensburg and CESifo Munich), Richard Cornes (0000-0002-7688-4485, Australian National University), Dirk Rübbelke (0000-0002-9934-8570, Basque Centre for Climate Change and IKERBASQUE)
Year2014
Volume81
Issue322
Pages205-223
Publication date2014-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecca.12074
OpenAlexW2101791601
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited35

Experience from climate policy suggests that full cooperation among all countries is not a likely outcome. In this paper we therefore consider the case where only members of a subgroup of countries cooperate by reciprocally matching their public good contributions. In a two‐stage game, matching rates are set at stage 1 then national contributions are chosen at stage 2. In the case of small coalitions, negative matching may result in the subgame‐perfect equilibrium that decreases global public good provision and outsiders' welfare. Moreover, a growing number of countries may paradoxically entail a reduction of equilibrium public good supply

Economics · Market economy · Matching (statistics) · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Outcome (game theory) · Public economics · Public good · Set (abstract data type) · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Welfare · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization

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Unique citing works4
Citations per year0,33
Citation span2014 - 2024 (11)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

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