Tax Collection with Agency Costs
Private Contracting or Government Bureaucrats
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9725975 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 233 |
| Pages | 107 |
| Publication date | 1992-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2555069 |
| OpenAlex | W2047948110 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 4 |
Historically, governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes. This paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare-maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors. While bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs, profit-maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level. Generally, the choice of collection methods depends on a comparison of the welfare loss associated with monitoring in the bureaucratic setting and the welfare loss associated with overdetection of evasion in the private setting. Copyright 1992 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Agency (philosophy) · Business · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Public economics · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,24 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2025 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |