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Mark Toma

Biographic Data

ID709585
NAMEMark Toma
GIVEN NAMESMark
FAMILY NAMEToma
SIGNATURETOMA M
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Kentucky
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS13
TOTAL CITATIONS13
AUTHOR COUNT13
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1979
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2010
H-INDEX3
  • On Laurence Moss

    Open Access•Mark Toma, Mark Tomass•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•2010

  • Medieval Islamic Economic Thought

    Mark Toma, Mark Tomass•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•2007•References: 1

    Book Review| March 01 2007 Medieval Islamic Economic Thought: Filling the “Great Gap” in European Economics Edited by S. M. Ghazanfar. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. xv; 284 pp. $70.00. Mark Tomass Mark Tomass Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2007) 39 (1): 180–183. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2006-034 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer…

  • Appointing central bankers

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005

  • The role of tax bases and collections costs in the determination of income tax rates, seigniorage and inflation

    Open Access•Lawrence W Kenny, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•References: 18

  • Frank G. Steindl, Monetary interpretations of the Great Depression

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 1•References: 5

  • Interest Rate Controls

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•1992•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    In 1942 the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve agreed to keep the interest rate on long-term government bonds below a ceiling of 2.5 percent. Assuming rational expectations, the ceiling on long-term interest rates can be viewed as a government commitment to low long-run inflation. The Fed also agreed to buy and sell short-term government bonds at a below-market rate of 3/8 percent. This policy did not result in long-run inflation because it wa…

  • Tax Collection with Agency Costs

    Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Economica•1992

    Historically, governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes. This paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare-maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors. While bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs, profit-maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level. Gener…

  • Will bounty-hunting revenue agents increase enforcement

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • The policy effectiveness of open market operations in the 1920s

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Explorations in Economic History•1989•Cited by: 3•References: 11

  • Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks

    Open Access•Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1985•References: 2

  • Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan

    Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1984•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    Research Article| March 01 1984 Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan Eugenia Froedge Toma; Eugenia Froedge Toma 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Mark Toma Mark Toma Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1984) 16 (1): 89–105. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-16-1-89 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplement…

  • Bureaucratic responses to tax limitation amendments

    Open Access•Mark Toma, Eugenia Froedge Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1980•Cited by: 3•References: 5

  • The impact of institutional structures on city-country consolidation outcomes

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1979•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Interest Rate Controls

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•1992•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    In 1942 the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve agreed to keep the interest rate on long-term government bonds below a ceiling of 2.5 percent. Assuming rational expectations, the ceiling on long-term interest rates can be viewed as a government commitment to low long-run inflation. The Fed also agreed to buy and sell short-term government bonds at a below-market rate of 3/8 percent. This policy did not result in long-run inflation because it wa…

  • The policy effectiveness of open market operations in the 1920s

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Explorations in Economic History•1989•Cited by: 3•References: 11

  • Bureaucratic responses to tax limitation amendments

    Open Access•Mark Toma, Eugenia Froedge Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1980•Cited by: 3•References: 5

  • Frank G. Steindl, Monetary interpretations of the Great Depression

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 1•References: 5

  • Will bounty-hunting revenue agents increase enforcement

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan

    Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1984•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    Research Article| March 01 1984 Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan Eugenia Froedge Toma; Eugenia Froedge Toma 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Mark Toma Mark Toma Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1984) 16 (1): 89–105. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-16-1-89 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplement…

  • The impact of institutional structures on city-country consolidation outcomes

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1979•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • The impact of institutional structures on city-country consolidation outcomes

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1979•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Bureaucratic responses to tax limitation amendments

    Open Access•Mark Toma, Eugenia Froedge Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1980•Cited by: 3•References: 5

  • Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan

    Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1984•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    Research Article| March 01 1984 Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan Eugenia Froedge Toma; Eugenia Froedge Toma 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Mark Toma Mark Toma Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1984) 16 (1): 89–105. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-16-1-89 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplement…

  • Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks

    Open Access•Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1985•References: 2

  • Will bounty-hunting revenue agents increase enforcement

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • The policy effectiveness of open market operations in the 1920s

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Explorations in Economic History•1989•Cited by: 3•References: 11

  • Interest Rate Controls

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•1992•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    In 1942 the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve agreed to keep the interest rate on long-term government bonds below a ceiling of 2.5 percent. Assuming rational expectations, the ceiling on long-term interest rates can be viewed as a government commitment to low long-run inflation. The Fed also agreed to buy and sell short-term government bonds at a below-market rate of 3/8 percent. This policy did not result in long-run inflation because it wa…

  • Tax Collection with Agency Costs

    Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Economica•1992

    Historically, governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes. This paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare-maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors. While bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs, profit-maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level. Gener…

  • The role of tax bases and collections costs in the determination of income tax rates, seigniorage and inflation

    Open Access•Lawrence W Kenny, Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•References: 18

  • Frank G. Steindl, Monetary interpretations of the Great Depression

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 1•References: 5

  • Appointing central bankers

    Open Access•Mark Toma•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005

  • Medieval Islamic Economic Thought

    Mark Toma, Mark Tomass•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•2007•References: 1

    Book Review| March 01 2007 Medieval Islamic Economic Thought: Filling the “Great Gap” in European Economics Edited by S. M. Ghazanfar. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. xv; 284 pp. $70.00. Mark Tomass Mark Tomass Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2007) 39 (1): 180–183. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2006-034 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer…

  • On Laurence Moss

    Open Access•Mark Toma, Mark Tomass•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•2010

Economics (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Finance (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Public finance (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Finance (6 works) · Macroeconomics (5 works) · Public economics (5 works)

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