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Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan

Bibliographic Data

ID4805063
AuthorsEugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma
Year1984
Volume16
Issue1
Pages89-105
Publication date1984-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0018-2702 • E-ISSN: 1527-1919
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00182702-16-1-89
OpenAlexW1994480347
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited11

Research Article| March 01 1984 Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan Eugenia Froedge Toma; Eugenia Froedge Toma 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Mark Toma Mark Toma Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1984) 16 (1): 89–105. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-16-1-89 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma; Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan. History of Political Economy 1 March 1984; 16 (1): 89–105. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-16-1-89 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsHistory of Political Economy Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 1984 by Duke University Press1984 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content

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    Open Access•Mark Toma, Eugenia Froedge Toma•Public Choice•1980

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  • Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism

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Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,1
Citation span2005 - 2021 (17)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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