Self-Supporting Preferences and Individual Rights
The Possibility of Paretian Libertarianism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9726873 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Wulf Gaertner (0000-0002-4951-8623), Lorenz Kruger |
| Year | 1981 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 189 |
| Pages | 17 |
| Publication date | 1981-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2552940 |
| OpenAlex | W1977995920 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
| References cited | 3 |
One of the paradoxes in social choice theory that has caused considerable concern among theoretical economists is that of the impossibility of the Paretian liberal, which was discovered by Sen (1970a; 1970b, Chapter 6). It has been found disturbing that even a minimal amount of efficiency in social choice, as expressed by the Pareto principle, should not be compatible with a minimum of individual freedom, as expressed in a rather weak libertarian requirement which is imposed on the collective choice procedure. Therefore, it is not surprising that a large number of solutions to the have been proposed, the directions of these solutions diverging rather widely (for a very lucid discussion covering the whole spectrum, see Sen, 1976). It is the purpose of this paper to review very briefly the present state of the discussion (Section I) and to propose a new solution to the paradox that essentially focuses on the notion of an individual right and the appropriate amount of protection it should obtain in social decisions (Section II). Therefore, our solution to the liberal paradox may in some sense be viewed as a byproduct of properties one would like a theory of rights to exhibit. The solution is captured in our Theorem 1. For its derivation we use a basic lemma which establishes the consistency of the rights. All proofs are given in an Appendix
Arrow's impossibility theorem · Consistency (knowledge bases) · Economics · Impossibility · Law and economics · Lemma (botany) · Libertarianism · Mathematical economics · Mathematical proof · Pareto principle · Political science · Section (typography) · Social choice theory · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
Rights and the Private Pareto Principle
Why be Consistent? A Critical Analysis of Consistency Requirements in Choice Theory
The impossibility of nondictatorial tolerance
Rights and the liberal paradoxes
Social values and individual choices
Justice-constrained libertarian claims and Pareto efficient collective decisions
Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle
The Impossibility of a Paretian Republican? Some Comments on Pettit and Sen
Alternative libertarian claims and Sen's paradox
The liberatarian resolution of the Paretian liberal paradox
On the impossibility of a generalization of the libertarian resolution of the liberal paradox
Liberty, Preference, and Choice
On the Consistency of Libertarian Values
Republican freedom and the rule of law
On the possibility of Paretian liberalism
Rights
Envy-free rights assignments and self-oriented preferences
Presidential address Fourteen years of European Public Choice Society research
Le paradoxe libéral-parétien
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,43 |
| Citation span | 1982 - 2023 (42) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |