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The Interdependence between Ownership Status and Market Structure

The Case of Privatization

Bibliographic Data

ID9727663
AuthorsChaim Fershtman (corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume57
Issue227
Pages319
Publication date1990-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2554937
OpenAlexW1989679567
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited4

One of the common justifications for privatization policy is the assertion that private firms are more efficient and thus potentially more profitable. The analysis of privatization policy, however, cannot be complete without specific attention to the market structure in which the firm operates and in particular to the interdependence between the ownership status and market structure. I examine a dupolistic market and demonstrate that a partly nationalized firm might realize higher profits than its private, profit-maximizing, competitor. The degree of nationalization also affects the interaction between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. Using A. K. Dixit's framework, I consider the implications of privatization on the attractiveness of entry, the possibility of deterring entry, and the incumbent position as a natural monopoly. It is shown that it is possible that a firm is not a natural monopoly while being private but that alteration of its ownership status can transform it to a natural monopoly. Such an analysis establishes my main claim that ownership status may affect the market structure in which firms operate

Assertion · Attractiveness · Business · Economics · Industrial organization · Market economy · Market structure · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Natural monopoly · Position (finance) · Profit (economics) · Corporate Finance and Governance · Finance · Global trade and economics · Merger and Competition Analysis

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Unique citing works6
Citations per year0,19
Citation span1994 - 2023 (30)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 5

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