Sen’s Theorem and Externalities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9727736 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Donald E Campbell (William & Mary), Jerry S Kelly (Syracuse University) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 255 |
| Pages | 375-386 |
| Publication date | 1997-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0335.00086 |
| OpenAlex | W1985233474 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 5 |
When the outcome space X is a product set, the Paretian‐liberal conflict depends on a special cycle of externalities. Even if the society is countably infinite, the inconsistency vanishes if the individuals can be numbered so that person i does not care about the actions of any h i , although we assume that the liberal constraint is binding only on finite coalitions
Combinatorics · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Countable set · Economics · Externality · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory) · Product (mathematics) · Set (abstract data type) · Space (punctuation) · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,1 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2006 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |