What About an International Office for Education

invasion and the strength of the French determination to find security. Marshal Foch had commanded the armies in their great victory, but even the French ignored his pleas for security. In spite of this, many of us felt that the French were too vindictive, too unforgiving, too self-seeking. We had insufficient understanding of their fears and sufferings, and consequently no adequate substitute for the French proposals for permanently crippling German military strength or at least containing it within safe bounds. The result was that the French built their cordon sanitaire against Germany, and out of their own fears contributed to preventing central Europe from subsiding into a condition of peace.' At the same time, Great Britain feared a strong Germany, a strong France, and eventually a strong Russia. In self-defense it reverted to its traditional balance-of-power politics. It kept the pot boiling in this way with ill esults in Ethiopia and Spain, and eventually made possible the Soviet-German Pact of 1939. The United States had no substitute to offer the British. Our own desire to withdraw from the squabbles of Europe and the international politics of France and Britain was never understood abroad. Nor did we here appreciate the organic nature of the world of nations. As Walter Lippmann said

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