Children’s competence or adults’ incompetence
Different developmental trajectories in different tasks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9788129 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sarah Furlan (0000-0002-7706-6150, University of Padua, corresponding author), Franca Agnoli (0000-0001-7940-4080), Valerie F Reyna (0000-0003-2851-5797, Cornell University) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 1466-1480 |
| Publication date | 2013-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Developmental Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-1649 • E-ISSN: 1939-0599 |
| Publisher | American Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1037/a0030509 |
| PMID | 23148936 |
| PMCID | PMC3737320 |
| OpenAlex | W2050139182 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 40 |
Dual-process theories have been proposed to explain normative and heuristic responses to reasoning and decision-making problems. Standard unitary and dual-process theories predict that normative responses should increase with age. However, research has focused recently on exceptions to this standard pattern, including developmental increases in heuristic or intuitive responses. Developmental trends for normative and heuristic responses were investigated for 2 kinds of causal reasoning (if-only and covariation) problems in 2 experiments. To investigate the role of superstitious thinking in these developmental trends, in both experiments a superstitious element was added to the problem solved by half the participants. In the first experiment, 90 fifth graders, 99 seventh graders, and 153 adults responded to an if-only problem. Children performed better than adults, with normative responses decreasing and heuristic responses increasing with age. A superstitious jinx intended to reduce heuristic responses had little effect for all age groups. In the second experiment, 276 fifth graders, 344 seventh graders, and 90 adults responded to a covariation-detection problem. When win-loss ratios were equal, adults performed better than children, with normative responses increasing and heuristic responses decreasing with age. When win-loss ratios were strikingly different, however, even the youngest children were able to solve the problems correctly; participants of all ages responded about equally well. When the normative response required recognizing that a good-luck ritual led to better team performance, participants in all age groups responded skeptically that the ritual had no effect, illustrating belief bias. These results are discussed in terms of dual-process theories and the development of heuristic (or intuitive) and analytical processes
Cognitive psychology · Competence (human resources · Developmental psychology · Heuristic · Luck · Normative · Artificial Intelligence · Child and Animal Learning Development · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Psychology · Social Psychology
Human inference
In two minds
Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions
Paranormal beliefs, education, and thinking styles
Fuzzy-trace theory
Two Is Not Always Better Than One
Psychological Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions
On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning
The simulation heuristic
Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making
Model Selection and Multimodel Inference
A Theory of Medical Decision Making and Health
How People Make Decisions That Involve Risk
Numeracy, ratio bias, and denominator neglect in judgments of risk and probability
The hot hand in basketball
A new look at the statistical model identification
Categorical data analysis
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Children's Memory and Metaphorical Interpretation
Class inclusion, the conjunction fallacy, and other cognitive illusions
Dual processes in decision making and developmental neuroscience
Phenomenalistic Reality
Developmental reversals in false memory
Cance and luck are not the same
Good luck and bad luck
Irrational reactions to negative outcomes
When less is not always more
Reality Compared With Its Alternatives
Bias in adolescents' everyday reasoning and its relationship with intellectual ability, personal theories, and self-serving motivation
Development of gist versus verbatim memory in sentence recognition
Development of scientific reasoning biases
The Folk Concept of Intentionality
Ghosts, UFOs, and magic
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles
Counterfactual thinking
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |