Reliable Partners

How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace

Bibliographic Data

ID9824276
AuthorsG John Ikenberry (corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume83
Issue1
Pages167
Publication date2004-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeREVIEW
Review ofReliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace, Charles Lipson, 2013
VenueForeign Affairs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0015-7120 • E-ISSN: 2327-7793
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/20033841
OpenAlexW1523426086
LanguageEN

Democracies often go to war but almost never against each other. Indeed, democratic has become a catchphrase among scholars and even U.S. Presidents. But why do democracies avoid fighting each other? Reliable Partners offers the first systematic and definitive explanation. Examining decades of research and speculation on the subject and testing this against the history of relations between democracies over the last two centuries, Charles Lipson concludes that constitutional democracies have a contracting advantage - a unique ability to settle conflicts with each other by durable agreements. In so doing, he forcefully counters realist claims that a regime's character is irrelevant to war and peace. Lipson argues that because democracies are confident their bargains will stick, they can negotiate effective settlements with each other rather than incur the great costs of war. Why are democracies more reliable partners? Because their politics are uniquely open to outside scrutiny and facilitate long-term commitments, they cannot easily bluff, deceive, or launch surprise attacks. While this transparency weakens their bargaining position, it also makes their promises more credible - and more durable, for democracies are generally stable. Their leaders are constrained by constitutional rules, independent officials, and the political costs of abandoning public commitments. All this allows for solid bargains between democracies. When democracies contemplate breaking their agreements, their open debate gives partners advance notice and a chance to protect themselves. Hence, agreements among democracies are less risky than those with nondemocratic states. Setting rigorous analysis in friendly, vigorous prose, Reliable Partners resolves longstanding questions about the democratic peace and highlights important new findings about democracies in world politics, from rivalries to alliances. Above all, it shows conclusively that democracies are uniquely adapted to seal enduring bargains with each other and thus avoid the blight of war

Development economics · Economic system · Economics · Peacekeeping · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Public Administration

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