The normative significance of future moral revolutions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9845009
AutoresJohn Danaher (0000-0001-5879-3160, Ollscoil na Gaillimhe – University of Galway), Jeroen Hopster (0000-0001-9239-3048, Utrecht University, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume144
Páginas103046
Data de publicação2022-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoFutures (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0016-3287 • E-ISSN: 1873-6378
EditoraElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.futures.2022.103046
OpenAlexW4306386364
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas51

Since moral revolutions have occurred in the past, it seems plausible to suppose that they will occur again in the future. What significance, if any, does this prospect have for our present normative outlook? This paper identifies eight ways in which this question may be answered, drawing on recent arguments in the philosophical literature. Our aim is not to vindicate any of these purported normative responses as correct. Instead, our aim is taxonomic and synoptic: we provide an overview of the different responses that the prospect of future moral revolutions gives rise to and analyze how these responses are modulated by judgements of certainty and uncertainty, whether they are practically or epistemically oriented, and to what extent they depend on ethical and metaethical assumptions

Certainty · Economics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Normative · Positive economics · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment