Hearing the Silences in Thomas Bernhard's Ja
Difference, Narrative, and Lyotard's Concept of the Differend
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9854209 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Teresa Ludden (University of Newcastle Australia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 6-19 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | German Life and Letters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0016-8777 • E-ISSN: 1468-0483 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0483.2009.01479.x |
| OpenAlex | W2040420784 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
This article examines Thomas Bernhard's largely neglected short novel Ja (1978) in terms of how silences and textual lacunae function. It uses Lyotard's concept of the differend and Wittgenstein's notion of language‐games to analyse the representation of the relationship between the narrator's inner monologue and the female character, ‘die Perserin’. It argues that the text alludes to incommensurability between the narrator's idiom and the Persian woman's history and suffering, as well as criticising the imposition of a meta‐language and practising an anti‐ventriloquism regarding the Persian woman's pain and despair, thus opening the narrative and the text up to its own silences and failings. Dieser Artikel untersucht die Funktion des Schweigens in Thomas Bernhards Roman Ja (1978). Er nimmt Jean‐François Lyotards Konzept des Differend und Ludwig Wittgensteins Theorie der Sprachspiele zu Hilfe, um das erzählerische Monolog und die Darstellung der schweigsamen ‘Perserin’ zu analysieren. Bernhards Text bezieht sich auf Lücken und Schweigen, indem er nicht für die Perserin spricht sondern auf die Undarstellbarkeit ihres Schmerzes und ihrer Geschichte in der Sprache des Erzählers hinweist. Dadurch thematisiert der Text die Unmöglichkeit einer universalen Metasprache und eine Kritik des Erzählens überhaupt
Art · Humanities · Literature · Narrative · Theology · Contemporary Literature and Criticism · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Highly cited | No |
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