How are professionals recruited by external agents in misconduct projects? The infiltration of organized crime in a university

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9890458
AutoresGiovanni Radaelli (0000-0003-1555-8122, University of Warwick, autor de correspondencia), Marco Guerci (0000-0002-4739-3644, University of Milan, autor de correspondencia), Federica Cabras (0000-0001-8500-3515, University of Milan, autor de correspondencia), Nando Dalla Chiesa (University of Milan, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen72
Número9
Páginas1407-1435
Fecha de publicación2019-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaHuman Relations (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0018-7267 • E-ISSN: 1741-282X
EditorialSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0018726718782616
OpenAlexW2883530585
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas41

Private firms, crime organizations or states may successfully recruit professionals in misconduct projects. How they do so remains, however, under-investigated. Past studies mostly take professionals’ perspective, or limit the organizational initiative of external agents to perverse incentives and threats. Our study shows instead how external agents may penetrate governance bodies and professional events to recruit and control professionals, who are both aware of and reluctant toward misconduct. Our longitudinal case study used judicial and non-judicial sources to analyse how a mafia clan infiltrated Troy University, and controlled the trade of exams and admissions for decades. The clan selected Troy University because of the presence of professors pre-disposed toward misconduct. The clan infiltrated the pre-disposed professors inside governance bodies and students inside academic events to recruit the reluctant professors with peer pressures, situated threats and administrative controls. It then exploited a generalized code of silence to control professionals for years. Overall, the study highlights the combination of perverse and pervasive mechanisms to recruit professionals; the role of corrupt professionals as linchpin between external agents and reluctant peers; and the perverse exploitation of normal professional practices of autonomy, trusteeship and multiple embeddedness

Autonomy · Business · Clan · Corporate governance · Criminology · Economics · Embeddedness · Incentive · Insider · Misconduct · Political science · Public relations · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Ethics in Business and Education · Law