Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9950102 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luca Anderlini (0000-0001-7636-5645, Georgetown University), Leonardo Felli (0000-0001-6113-6014, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 116 |
| Issue | 508 |
| Pages | 223-245 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01054.x |
| OpenAlex | W2157675730 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 22 |
This paper explores the extent to which "ex ante" transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify the basic 'hold-up problem' that arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay "ex ante costs" for the negotiation to take place. We then show that a 'Coasian solution' to this problem is not available: a Coasian solution typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation, which in turn is associated with a fresh set of "ex ante" costs, and hence a new hold-up problem. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society
Coase theorem · Database · Database transaction · Economics · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Robustness (evolution · Transaction cost · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
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| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2023 (18) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |