Incentives in the Public Sector
Evidence from a Government Agency
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9711147 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Stephen Burge (0000-0001-7206-3674, University of Bristol), Simon Burgess (University of Bristol, CMPO and CEPR), Carol Propper (0000-0002-8257-431X, University of Bristol, CMPO, Imperial College London and CEPR), Marisa Ratto (0000-0003-4521-2448, Universite Paris‐Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi), Emma Tominey (University of York, CMPO, and IZA) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 127 |
| Número | 605 |
| Páginas | F117-F141 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12422 |
| OpenAlex | W2234629593 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 13 |
| Referencias citadas | 36 |
We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small teams, fitting an explanation combining free riding and peer monitoring. We also show that the impact was greater on better-measured quantity outcomes than quality outcomes. The scheme was very cost effective in small offices
Actuarial science · Agency (philosophy · Business · Differential (mechanical device · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Performance-related pay · Perspective (graphical · Productivity · Public economics · Public sector · Quality (philosophy · Scheme (mathematics · Accounting and Organizational Management · Computer Science · Engineering · Public Policy and Administration Research
Bureaucrat Allocation in the Public Sector
The impact of collective performance-related pay on street-level bureaucrats’ performance and clients’ outcomes
Motivating bureaucrats with behavioral insights when state capacity is weak
Better together? Group incentives and the demand for prevention
Performance measurability, local government’s incentives, and regional air pollution reduction
Performance Pay in Insurance Markets
Bonus incentives and team effort levels
Incentive-based Social Welfare Administration in Indonesia
Effects of individual incentive reforms in the public sector
The effect of pay for performance on work attitudes in the private, public, and nonprofit sectors
Overshooting and Adjustment
Group-Based Incentives and Individual Performance
Incentives and effort in the public and private sector
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector
Moral Hazard in Teams
Reinventing Government
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision
Matching As An Econometric Evaluation Estimator
Incentives, Choice, and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services
The economics of lending with joint liability
Exploring the relationship between performance management and program impact
Teacher Performance Pay
Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance
Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations
Peer Pressure and Partnerships
Compensation and Productive Efficiency in Partnerships
Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort
The Consequences of the Decline in Public Sector Pay in Britain
Performance‐based Wages in Tax Collection
Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
| Obras citantes distintas | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,17 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 13 |