Michael Huemer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1037740 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Huemer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Huemer |
| SIGNATURE | HUEMER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Boulder |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2346-3468 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 42 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 148 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 42 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
On the Morality of Killing Human Shields
I argue that when an enemy deploys human shields in war, it is permissible to discount the shields' presence to some degree in planning the sort of military options the human shields were meant to deter. I reject two proposed rationales for this – the argument that only the user of human shields will be responsible for their deaths and the argument that the initial victim of a rights‐violation must bear the costs rather than transferring them to …
I, for one, welcome our robot overlords
Do older 2-year-olds deploy explicit possibility concepts in action planning
The knowledge (“true belief”) error in 4- to 6-year-old children
The standard view on explicit theory of mind development holds that children around the age of 4 years start to ascribe beliefs to themselves and others, typically tested with false belief (FB) tasks. The present study (N = 95, 53 female, 41 male, Austrian, 41 to 80 months) systematically investigated the puzzling phenomenon that FB achievers (FB+) fail knowledge (often subsumed under "true belief") tasks: Despite the story protagonist witnessing…
Is Political Authority an Illusion?
Open Borders
When All Else Fails
Gun Rights as Deontic Constraints
In earlier work, I argued that gun prohibition is unjustified because it violates an individual right to self-defense. Here, I defend that argument against objections posed by Nicholas Dixon and Jeff McMahan to the effect that the right of citizens to be free from gun violence counterbalances the right of self-defense, and that gun prohibition does not violate the right of self-defense because it renders everyone overall safer
Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism
After lives filled with deep suffering, 74 billion animals are slaughtered worldwide every year on factory farms. Is it wrong to buy the products of this industry? In this book, two college students – a meat-eater and an ethical vegetarian – discuss this question in a series of dialogues conducted over four days. The issues they cover include: how intelligence affects the badness of pain, whether consumers are responsible for the practices of an …
Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism
Paradox Lost
Paradox Lost
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite …
Confessions of a Utopophobe
Ideal theorists in political philosophy seek to describe a perfect political society, and to evaluate political principles by reference to their consequences in a world where everyone complies with the principles. I argue that ideal theory is not needed to set goals for practical inquiries, nor to define justice, nor to enable rankings of injustices. Nor is it useful to theorize about very different kinds of society that might occur in the far fu…
Inferential Appearances
Under what conditions is one justified in believing P on the basis of E? According to Richard Fumerton's 'inferential internalism,' one must have justification for believing that E makes probable P. This chapter proposes that this condition is satisfied by a special sort of appearance, an 'inferential appearance,' by which it seems to one that P must be or is likely to be true in the light of E. This account explains the sense in which one must '…
The Problem of Political Authority
The state is often ascribed a special sort of authority, one that obliges citizens to obey its commands and entitles the state to enforce those commands through threats of violence. This book argues t
The Problem of Political Authority
Let us begin with a short political story. You live in a small village with a crime problem. Vandals roam the village, stealing and destroying people’s property. No one seems to be doing anything about it. So one day, you and your family decide to put a stop to it. You take your guns and go looking for vandals. Periodically, you catch one, take him back to your house at gunpoint, and lock him in the basement. You provide the prisoners with food s…
Transitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics
Against Equality and Priority
I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y ; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y , then x is better than y ; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that equality lacks intrinsic value, and that benefits given to the worse-off co…
Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat
The Puzzle of Metacoherence
Is There a Right to Immigrate
Immigration restrictions violate the prima facie right of potential immigrants not to be subject to harmful coercion. This prima facie right is not neutralized or outweighed by the economic, fiscal, or cultural effects of immigration, nor by the state’s special duties to its own citizens, or to its poorest citizens. Nor does the state have a right to control citizenship conditions in the same way that private clubs may control their membership co…
A Paradox for Weak Deontology
Deontological ethicists generally agree that there is a way of harming others such that it is wrong to harm others in that way for the sake of producing a comparable but greater benefit for others. Given plausible assumptions, this principle leads to the possibility of paradoxical cases in which each of two actions is wrong, yet the combination of both actions is permissible. Consequentialism provides the most natural solution of the puzzle
Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic
A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple…
When Is Parsimony a Virtue
Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical c…
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism
I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self‐defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for P…
When Is Parsimony a Virtue
Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical c…
Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic
A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple…
Causation as Simultaneous and Continuous
We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time
Transitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics
The Puzzle of Metacoherence
Epistemic Possibility
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite …
Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument
Research Article| October 01 2000 Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument Michael Huemer Michael Huemer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 525–544. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-525 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Huemer; Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2000; 109 (4):…
Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument
The brain-in-a-vat argument for skepticism is best formulated, not using the closure principle, but using the Preference Principle, which states that in order to be justified in believing H on the basis of E, one must have grounds for preferring H over each alternative explanation of E. When the argument is formulated this way, Dretske's and Klein's responses to it fail. However, the strengthened argument can be refuted using a direct realist acc…
Weak Bayesian coherentism
Apology of a Modest Intuitionist
A Paradox for Weak Deontology
Deontological ethicists generally agree that there is a way of harming others such that it is wrong to harm others in that way for the sake of producing a comparable but greater benefit for others. Given plausible assumptions, this principle leads to the possibility of paradoxical cases in which each of two actions is wrong, yet the combination of both actions is permissible. Consequentialism provides the most natural solution of the puzzle
Rawls's Problem of Stability
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la stabilite de la conception de la justice comme loyaute (justice as fairness) developpee par J. Rawls dans son ouvrage intitule «Political liberalism» (1993) n'est pas garantie par le fait d'un pluralisme raisonnable ni par l'idee d'un consensus general. Avancant l'hypothese d'un fondamentaliste chretien, l'A. oppose de nombreuses objections au projet de Rawls
A Defense of the Given
What is the connection between experience and knowledge? Evan Fales defends the contested idea that sense experience can be used to justify basic beliefs. He explores what it is for a belief to be self-evident and examines implications for his argument of Gestalt psychology and visual phenomena and illusions. Fales diverges from classical foundationalism, however, arguing that basic beliefs are often only probable, rather than infallible. A Defen…
Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument
Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument
Research Article| October 01 2000 Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument Michael Huemer Michael Huemer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 525–544. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-525 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Huemer; Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2000; 109 (4):…
Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument
The brain-in-a-vat argument for skepticism is best formulated, not using the closure principle, but using the Preference Principle, which states that in order to be justified in believing H on the basis of E, one must have grounds for preferring H over each alternative explanation of E. When the argument is formulated this way, Dretske's and Klein's responses to it fail. However, the strengthened argument can be refuted using a direct realist acc…
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
"Michael Huemer is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder."
Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification
Is There a Right to Own a Gun
Causation as Simultaneous and Continuous
We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time
Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee
Research Article| July 01 2004 Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee Michael Huemer Michael Huemer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 411–416. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3-411 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Huemer; Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2004; 11…
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
Book Review| April 01 2004 The Oxford Handbook of Free Will Robert Kane, editor, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xviii, 638. Michael Huemer Michael Huemer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 279–283. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-2-279 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation …
Ethical Intuitionism
A defence of ethical intuitionism where (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know these through an immediate, intellectual awareness, or 'intuition'; and (iii) knowing them gives us reasons t
Epistemic Possibility
Weak Bayesian coherentism
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism
I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self‐defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for P…
Apology of a Modest Intuitionist
Précis of Ethical Intuitionism
A Paradox for Weak Deontology
Deontological ethicists generally agree that there is a way of harming others such that it is wrong to harm others in that way for the sake of producing a comparable but greater benefit for others. Given plausible assumptions, this principle leads to the possibility of paradoxical cases in which each of two actions is wrong, yet the combination of both actions is permissible. Consequentialism provides the most natural solution of the puzzle
Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic
A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple…
When Is Parsimony a Virtue
Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical c…
Is There a Right to Immigrate
Immigration restrictions violate the prima facie right of potential immigrants not to be subject to harmful coercion. This prima facie right is not neutralized or outweighed by the economic, fiscal, or cultural effects of immigration, nor by the state’s special duties to its own citizens, or to its poorest citizens. Nor does the state have a right to control citizenship conditions in the same way that private clubs may control their membership co…
Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat
The Puzzle of Metacoherence
Against Equality and Priority
I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y ; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y , then x is better than y ; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that equality lacks intrinsic value, and that benefits given to the worse-off co…
The Problem of Political Authority
The state is often ascribed a special sort of authority, one that obliges citizens to obey its commands and entitles the state to enforce those commands through threats of violence. This book argues t
Epistemology (27 works) · Philosophy (27 works) · Computer Science (17 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (15 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Political science (9 works)