Philip G Brooks
Biographic Data
| ID | 10844179 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philip G Brooks |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philip G |
| FAMILY NAME | Brooks |
| SIGNATURE | BROOKS P G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Plymouth Marine Laboratory |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1985 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Attentional bias and decision order in a reasoning task
An experiment is reported which is designed to test the hypothesis that selection errors in the abstract form of the Wason four‐card selection task derive from an attentional bias. Specifically, it is hypothesized that subjects' choices are based upon the perceived relevance of the exposed sides of the cards, as determined by linguistic cues, and that they do not reflect any analysis of the possible hidden sides of the card as required by the log…
Prior beliefs and statistical inference
This research aims to resolve an apparent paradox between findings in the literatures on statistical judgement and deductive reasoning. In the former, a tendency to ignore base‐rates has often been interpreted as a failure to take account of Bayesian ‘prior’ probabilities. On the other hand there is evidence that prior beliefs influence deductive inferences when they are formally irrelevant. In this paper two experiments are reported in which sub…
Prior beliefs and statistical inference
This research aims to resolve an apparent paradox between findings in the literatures on statistical judgement and deductive reasoning. In the former, a tendency to ignore base‐rates has often been interpreted as a failure to take account of Bayesian ‘prior’ probabilities. On the other hand there is evidence that prior beliefs influence deductive inferences when they are formally irrelevant. In this paper two experiments are reported in which sub…
Prior beliefs and statistical inference
This research aims to resolve an apparent paradox between findings in the literatures on statistical judgement and deductive reasoning. In the former, a tendency to ignore base‐rates has often been interpreted as a failure to take account of Bayesian ‘prior’ probabilities. On the other hand there is evidence that prior beliefs influence deductive inferences when they are formally irrelevant. In this paper two experiments are reported in which sub…
Attentional bias and decision order in a reasoning task
An experiment is reported which is designed to test the hypothesis that selection errors in the abstract form of the Wason four‐card selection task derive from an attentional bias. Specifically, it is hypothesized that subjects' choices are based upon the perceived relevance of the exposed sides of the cards, as determined by linguistic cues, and that they do not reflect any analysis of the possible hidden sides of the card as required by the log…
Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Statistics (2 works) · Bayesian inference (1 work)