Prior beliefs and statistical inference
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9619242 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J St B T Evans (Plymouth Marine Laboratory, corresponding author), Philip G Brooks (Plymouth Marine Laboratory), Paul Pollard (Plymouth Marine Laboratory) |
| Year | 1985 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 469-477 |
| Publication date | 1985-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1269 • E-ISSN: 2044-8295 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1985.tb01970.x |
| OpenAlex | W2120339777 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
This research aims to resolve an apparent paradox between findings in the literatures on statistical judgement and deductive reasoning. In the former, a tendency to ignore base‐rates has often been interpreted as a failure to take account of Bayesian ‘prior’ probabilities. On the other hand there is evidence that prior beliefs influence deductive inferences when they are formally irrelevant. In this paper two experiments are reported in which subjects were required to make two types of statistical judgement, one of which should be affected by prior beliefs and the other of which should be independent of any prior opinions. Genuine real‐world beliefs, as opposed to stated base‐rates, were used to determine prior probabilities. As predicted, subjects' inferences were significantly affected by prior opinions on both kinds of question. However, prior beliefs exerted a significantly stronger influence on the question for which they would be deemed relevant in a Bayesian analysis
Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Bayesian statistics · Cognitive psychology · Econometrics · Epistemology · Frequentist probability · Inference · Judgement · Prior probability · Statistical analysis · Statistical evidence · Statistical inference · Statistics · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Forecasting Techniques and Applications · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Approximating Bayes? On the role of approximations in Bayesian cognitive science
Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism
Linking structures and sensitivity to judgment-relevant information in statistical and logical reasoning tasks
Logical, Statistical, and Causal Reasoning
Bias in the use of base rates
| Citations per year | 0.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1988 - 2025 (38) |
| Highly cited | No |