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Nick Bostrom

Datos Biográficos

ID1295191
NOMBRENick Bostrom
NOMBRESNick
APELLIDOBostrom
FIRMABOSTROM N
AFILIACIONESUniversity of Oxford
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS17
TOTAL DE CITAS113
TOTAL COMO AUTOR17
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2001
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2024
ÍNDICE H6
  • Deep Utopia

    Nick Bostrom•BOOK•Deep Utopia•2024

  • Racing to the precipice

    Open Access•Stuart Armstrong, Nick Bostrom et al.•ARTICLE•AI & Society•2016

  • The ethics of artificial intelligence

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom, Eliezer Yudkowsky•CHAPTER•Cambridge Handbook of Artificial…•2014

    This chapter surveys some of the ethical challenges that may arise as one can create artificial intelligences (AI) of various kinds and degrees. Some challenges of machine ethics are much like many other challenges involved in designing machines. There is nearly universal agreement among modern AI professionals that artificial intelligence falls short of human capabilities in some critical sense, even though AI algorithms have beaten humans in ma…

  • Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Global Policy•2013

    Existential risks are those that threaten the entire future of humanity. Many theories of value imply that even relatively small reductions in net existential risk have enormous expected value. Despite their importance, issues surrounding human‐extinction risks and related hazards remain poorly understood. In this article, I clarify the concept of existential risk and develop an improved classification scheme. I discuss the relation between exist…

  • Cognitive Enhancement

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom, A Sandberg•ARTICLE•Science and Engineering Ethics•2009

  • Letter from Utopia

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Studies in Ethics Law and…•2008

    Although this letter uses the singular, I am really writing on behalf of my all my contemporaries, and we are addressing ourselves to all of your contemporaries. Amongst us are many who are possible futures of your people. Some of us are possible futures of children you have not yet given birth to. Still others are possible artificial persons that you might one day create. What unites us is that we are all dependent on you to make us real. Think …

  • Sleeping Beauty and Self-location

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Synthese•2007•Citada por: 11•Referencias: 13

  • Transhumanist Values

    Nick Bostrom, Philosophy Documentation Center•ARTICLE•Journal of Philosophical Research•2005

  • In Defense of Posthuman Dignity

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Bioethics•2005

    Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (w…

  • The Simulation Argument

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2005•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 2

    I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my ‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on ‘grue’-like predicates

  • Human Genetic Enhancements

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•2003

  • Astronomical Waste

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2003•Citada por: 34•Referencias: 2

    With very advanced technology, a very large population of people living happy lives could be sustained in the accessible region of the universe. For every year that development of such technologies and colonization of the universe is delayed, there is therefore a corresponding opportunity cost: a potential good, lives worth living, is not being realized. Given some plausible assumptions, this cost is extremely large. However, the lesson for stand…

  • The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption

    Nick Bostrom, Milan M Cirkovic•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 8

    In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argume…

  • When machines outsmart humans

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Futures•2003•Citada por: 7•Referencias: 1

  • Taking intelligent machines seriously

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Futures•2003•Referencias: 6

  • Are We Living in a Computer Simulation

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 47•Referencias: 5

    I argue that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to become extinct before reaching a 'posthuman' stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of its evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we shall one day…

  • The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Synthese•2001•Citada por: 7•Referencias: 22

  • Are We Living in a Computer Simulation

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 47•Referencias: 5

    I argue that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to become extinct before reaching a 'posthuman' stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of its evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we shall one day…

  • Astronomical Waste

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2003•Citada por: 34•Referencias: 2

    With very advanced technology, a very large population of people living happy lives could be sustained in the accessible region of the universe. For every year that development of such technologies and colonization of the universe is delayed, there is therefore a corresponding opportunity cost: a potential good, lives worth living, is not being realized. Given some plausible assumptions, this cost is extremely large. However, the lesson for stand…

  • Sleeping Beauty and Self-location

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Synthese•2007•Citada por: 11•Referencias: 13

  • When machines outsmart humans

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Futures•2003•Citada por: 7•Referencias: 1

  • The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Synthese•2001•Citada por: 7•Referencias: 22

  • The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption

    Nick Bostrom, Milan M Cirkovic•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 8

    In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argume…

  • The Simulation Argument

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2005•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 2

    I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my ‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on ‘grue’-like predicates

  • The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Synthese•2001•Citada por: 7•Referencias: 22

  • Human Genetic Enhancements

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•2003

  • Astronomical Waste

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2003•Citada por: 34•Referencias: 2

    With very advanced technology, a very large population of people living happy lives could be sustained in the accessible region of the universe. For every year that development of such technologies and colonization of the universe is delayed, there is therefore a corresponding opportunity cost: a potential good, lives worth living, is not being realized. Given some plausible assumptions, this cost is extremely large. However, the lesson for stand…

  • The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption

    Nick Bostrom, Milan M Cirkovic•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 8

    In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argume…

  • When machines outsmart humans

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Futures•2003•Citada por: 7•Referencias: 1

  • Taking intelligent machines seriously

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Futures•2003•Referencias: 6

  • Are We Living in a Computer Simulation

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2003•Citada por: 47•Referencias: 5

    I argue that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to become extinct before reaching a 'posthuman' stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of its evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we shall one day…

  • Transhumanist Values

    Nick Bostrom, Philosophy Documentation Center•ARTICLE•Journal of Philosophical Research•2005

  • In Defense of Posthuman Dignity

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Bioethics•2005

    Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (w…

  • The Simulation Argument

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2005•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 2

    I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my ‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on ‘grue’-like predicates

  • Sleeping Beauty and Self-location

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Synthese•2007•Citada por: 11•Referencias: 13

  • Letter from Utopia

    Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Studies in Ethics Law and…•2008

    Although this letter uses the singular, I am really writing on behalf of my all my contemporaries, and we are addressing ourselves to all of your contemporaries. Amongst us are many who are possible futures of your people. Some of us are possible futures of children you have not yet given birth to. Still others are possible artificial persons that you might one day create. What unites us is that we are all dependent on you to make us real. Think …

  • Cognitive Enhancement

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom, A Sandberg•ARTICLE•Science and Engineering Ethics•2009

  • Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom•ARTICLE•Global Policy•2013

    Existential risks are those that threaten the entire future of humanity. Many theories of value imply that even relatively small reductions in net existential risk have enormous expected value. Despite their importance, issues surrounding human‐extinction risks and related hazards remain poorly understood. In this article, I clarify the concept of existential risk and develop an improved classification scheme. I discuss the relation between exist…

  • The ethics of artificial intelligence

    Open Access•Nick Bostrom, Eliezer Yudkowsky•CHAPTER•Cambridge Handbook of Artificial…•2014

    This chapter surveys some of the ethical challenges that may arise as one can create artificial intelligences (AI) of various kinds and degrees. Some challenges of machine ethics are much like many other challenges involved in designing machines. There is nearly universal agreement among modern AI professionals that artificial intelligence falls short of human capabilities in some critical sense, even though AI algorithms have beaten humans in ma…

  • Racing to the precipice

    Open Access•Stuart Armstrong, Nick Bostrom et al.•ARTICLE•AI & Society•2016

  • Deep Utopia

    Nick Bostrom•BOOK•Deep Utopia•2024

Philosophy (10 obras) · Computer Science (9 obras) · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life (9 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (6 obras) · Business (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · Engineering (4 obras) · Engineering ethics (4 obras) · Environmental ethics (4 obras)

Ethnos_APP • Proyecto Open Source • Licencia MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidad y Cookies • Documentación de la API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código de la API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código del Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae