Andrew Futter
Biographic Data
| ID | 1471732 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Futter |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Futter |
| SIGNATURE | FUTTER A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leicester |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1793-9482 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Forum: European Nuclear Deterrence and Donald Trump
The return of nuclear great power politics (or why we stopped worrying about terrorists and the bomb)
With the decline of the Western framing of the war on terror (WoT) in security discourse, it has become commonplace to note the ‘return’ of great power politics. But under-analysed so far have been the nuclear dimensions of this trend. This is important because we are on the cusp of a multipolar order where the ‘poles of power’ are nuclear-armed. We outline the ways in which almost 30 years of perceptions of unipolarity, and particularly the focu…
Accommodating Nutopia: The nuclear ban treaty and the developmental interests of Global South countries
This article argues that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) would not have been possible without protecting the inalienable rights of states to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While some Western states and NGOs have pushed to ban all applications of nuclear technology, this was unacceptable to a large number of disarmament-supporting states from the Global South and the Non-Aligned Movement. Without support from …
Forum: Towards a European Nuclear Deterrent
America’s potential strategic disengagement from Europe is leading key European powers – in particular, France, the United Kingdom and Germany – to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in European security in the absence of extended US nuclear deterrence. Here leading French, British and German analysts offer anticipatory assessments of their countries’ national perceptions, policies and preferences with respect to formulating a common European…
Disruptive Technologies and Nuclear Risks: What’s New and What Matters
Hype and fear have arisen about how certain technological developments are impacting the current nuclear order. New weapons systems and support facilities, potential vulnerabilities and associated destabilising dynamics could all place considerable strain on the global nuclear balance and accompanying architecture. This article examines five disruptive dynamics, explains their intricacies and nuances, and puts them in political and strategic cont…
The Politics of Nuclear Weapons: New, updated and completely revised
Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age
Three decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how t…
Nuclear war, public health, the Covid-19 epidemic: Lessons for prevention, preparation, mitigation, and education
TEST 02 - Elsevier's Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Search and access research from the science, technology, medicine, social sciences and arts and humanities fields
The Politics of Nuclear Weapons: New, updated and completely revised
Democracy versus deterrence: Nuclear weapons and political integrity
This article argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of …
The new nuclear disorder: Challenges to deterrence and strategy
The new nuclear disorder: Challenges to deterrence and strategy." Comparative Strategy, 35(1), pp. 90–91
Questioning the holy trinity: Why the U.S. nuclear triad still makes sense
Despite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, a contemporary security environment far removed from that of the Cold War, and increasing budgetary pressures at home, U.S. interests continue to be best served by retaining a triad of nuclear forces. While options for a reduced force structure may appear to offer short-term political and economic expediency, in the long run a three-legged deterrent—possibly consisting of fewer delivery vehicles…
Iranian Nuclear Aspirations and Strategic Balancing in the Middle East
With a few notable exceptions, \n1 it has become almost conventional wisdom to assume that a \nnuclear Iran is bad for its immediate neighbors, the wider Middle East region, and even the \nworld.2 Such logic suggests that even an Iran with a nascent nuclear program would be \nemboldened in its meddling in Middle Eastern geopolitical affairs, present a serious, perhaps \nexistential, threat to Israel and others, and could potentially lead to a nuc…
Coordinating the arm swing with the pivot: Nuclear deterrence, stability and US strategy in the Asia-Pacific
The file associated with this record is embargoed until 18 months after the date of publication. The final published version may be available through the links above
China and global nuclear order: From estrangement to active engagement. By Nicola Horsburgh
Journal Article China and global nuclear order: from estrangement to active engagement. By Nicola Horsburgh Get access China and global nuclear order: from estrangement to active engagement. By Nicola Horsburgh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 256pp. £59.50. ISBN 978 0 19870 611 3. Available as e-book. Andrew Futter Andrew Futter 1University of Leicester, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Internati…
Getting the Balance Right: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and Nuclear Nonproliferation
Barack Obama has rightly embraced ballistic missile defense (BMD) as an important component of U.S. national security policy in an era where the requirements of nuclear deterrence are fluid and nuanced. Moreover, the deployment of these defenses may even provide several important benefits to the President's much-publicized nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. However, if the President's commitment to these goals is to remain credible …
Short‐Term Tactical Gains and Long‐Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq
As it entered its sixth year, many commentators have begun to suggest that the war in Iraq is at last moving in the right direction. In particular they are quick to point out the marked reduction i
Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age
Three decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how t…
Disruptive Technologies and Nuclear Risks: What’s New and What Matters
Hype and fear have arisen about how certain technological developments are impacting the current nuclear order. New weapons systems and support facilities, potential vulnerabilities and associated destabilising dynamics could all place considerable strain on the global nuclear balance and accompanying architecture. This article examines five disruptive dynamics, explains their intricacies and nuances, and puts them in political and strategic cont…
Democracy versus deterrence: Nuclear weapons and political integrity
This article argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of …
Questioning the holy trinity: Why the U.S. nuclear triad still makes sense
Despite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, a contemporary security environment far removed from that of the Cold War, and increasing budgetary pressures at home, U.S. interests continue to be best served by retaining a triad of nuclear forces. While options for a reduced force structure may appear to offer short-term political and economic expediency, in the long run a three-legged deterrent—possibly consisting of fewer delivery vehicles…
Short‐Term Tactical Gains and Long‐Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq
As it entered its sixth year, many commentators have begun to suggest that the war in Iraq is at last moving in the right direction. In particular they are quick to point out the marked reduction i
Getting the Balance Right: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and Nuclear Nonproliferation
Barack Obama has rightly embraced ballistic missile defense (BMD) as an important component of U.S. national security policy in an era where the requirements of nuclear deterrence are fluid and nuanced. Moreover, the deployment of these defenses may even provide several important benefits to the President's much-publicized nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. However, if the President's commitment to these goals is to remain credible …
Iranian Nuclear Aspirations and Strategic Balancing in the Middle East
With a few notable exceptions, \n1 it has become almost conventional wisdom to assume that a \nnuclear Iran is bad for its immediate neighbors, the wider Middle East region, and even the \nworld.2 Such logic suggests that even an Iran with a nascent nuclear program would be \nemboldened in its meddling in Middle Eastern geopolitical affairs, present a serious, perhaps \nexistential, threat to Israel and others, and could potentially lead to a nuc…
Coordinating the arm swing with the pivot: Nuclear deterrence, stability and US strategy in the Asia-Pacific
The file associated with this record is embargoed until 18 months after the date of publication. The final published version may be available through the links above
China and global nuclear order: From estrangement to active engagement. By Nicola Horsburgh
Journal Article China and global nuclear order: from estrangement to active engagement. By Nicola Horsburgh Get access China and global nuclear order: from estrangement to active engagement. By Nicola Horsburgh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 256pp. £59.50. ISBN 978 0 19870 611 3. Available as e-book. Andrew Futter Andrew Futter 1University of Leicester, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Internati…
The new nuclear disorder: Challenges to deterrence and strategy
The new nuclear disorder: Challenges to deterrence and strategy." Comparative Strategy, 35(1), pp. 90–91
Questioning the holy trinity: Why the U.S. nuclear triad still makes sense
Despite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, a contemporary security environment far removed from that of the Cold War, and increasing budgetary pressures at home, U.S. interests continue to be best served by retaining a triad of nuclear forces. While options for a reduced force structure may appear to offer short-term political and economic expediency, in the long run a three-legged deterrent—possibly consisting of fewer delivery vehicles…
Democracy versus deterrence: Nuclear weapons and political integrity
This article argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of …
Nuclear war, public health, the Covid-19 epidemic: Lessons for prevention, preparation, mitigation, and education
TEST 02 - Elsevier's Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Search and access research from the science, technology, medicine, social sciences and arts and humanities fields
The Politics of Nuclear Weapons: New, updated and completely revised
The Politics of Nuclear Weapons: New, updated and completely revised
Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age
Three decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how t…
Disruptive Technologies and Nuclear Risks: What’s New and What Matters
Hype and fear have arisen about how certain technological developments are impacting the current nuclear order. New weapons systems and support facilities, potential vulnerabilities and associated destabilising dynamics could all place considerable strain on the global nuclear balance and accompanying architecture. This article examines five disruptive dynamics, explains their intricacies and nuances, and puts them in political and strategic cont…
The return of nuclear great power politics (or why we stopped worrying about terrorists and the bomb)
With the decline of the Western framing of the war on terror (WoT) in security discourse, it has become commonplace to note the ‘return’ of great power politics. But under-analysed so far have been the nuclear dimensions of this trend. This is important because we are on the cusp of a multipolar order where the ‘poles of power’ are nuclear-armed. We outline the ways in which almost 30 years of perceptions of unipolarity, and particularly the focu…
Accommodating Nutopia: The nuclear ban treaty and the developmental interests of Global South countries
This article argues that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) would not have been possible without protecting the inalienable rights of states to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While some Western states and NGOs have pushed to ban all applications of nuclear technology, this was unacceptable to a large number of disarmament-supporting states from the Global South and the Non-Aligned Movement. Without support from …
Forum: Towards a European Nuclear Deterrent
America’s potential strategic disengagement from Europe is leading key European powers – in particular, France, the United Kingdom and Germany – to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in European security in the absence of extended US nuclear deterrence. Here leading French, British and German analysts offer anticipatory assessments of their countries’ national perceptions, policies and preferences with respect to formulating a common European…
Forum: European Nuclear Deterrence and Donald Trump
Political science (16 works) · Law (14 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (14 works) · Law (12 works) · Nuclear weapon (12 works) · Economics (8 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works)