Ilayda B Onder
Biographic Data
| ID | 2118808 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ilayda B Onder |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ilayda B |
| FAMILY NAME | Onder |
| SIGNATURE | ONDER I B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Texas A&M University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5712-8131 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Commanders of the Mujahideen
Recent research has explored how militant leaders' backgrounds shape their decision-making while in power. However, existing studies primarily focus on leaders of rebel groups participating in civil wars, overlooking smaller, yet lethal and influential, armed groups that operate outside civil war contexts. To address this gap, we introduce the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD), which provides original, systematic data on the backgrounds and prewar e…
Introducing the Rebel Internal Governance (RIG) Dataset
s Existing research shows that rebel groups develop strategies to mitigate principal-agent problems and align the preferences of rank and file fighters with those of leaders, and that these strategies influence conflict processes. Yet, systematic cross-national data on how groups regulate fighters, foster cohesion, and punish disobedience remain absent. To address this gap, we introduce the Rebel Internal Governance (RIG) Dataset, which codes ori…
A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups
This study develops a principal–agent theory of why armed groups engage in high-end cooperation involving training or intelligence. While such cooperation enhances capacity, it generates downstream risks. Principals mitigate these risks by selecting agents who are skill-wise complementary but politically non-substitutable. Agents accept high-end support when doing so does not leave them politically overshadowed by a dominant actor. Using original…
Beyond Outbidding
Numerous jihadist organizations pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (AQ) or the Islamic State (IS) in recent years. How do armed groups respond to competition from transnational jihadist rivals? A prominent strand of research argues that increased competition leads armed groups to outbid rivals through violent escalation. However, an alternative theory suggests that groups can restrain their violence to distinguish themselves from extremist rivals and…
Credit claims and the survival rates of terrorist organizations
We have nothing to do with it
Armed groups operating in conflicts around the world publish statements of denial to dissociate themselves from acts of violence. Existing research argues that armed groups publish denial statements to avoid public backlash, favorably frame the conduct of their campaigns, and distance themselves from unsanctioned actions conducted by rank‐and‐file members. However, the broader psychological impact of denial statements on public perceptions remain…
How Civilian Loyalties Shape Rebel-Led Victimization of Rebel Constituencies
Rebels rely on the support of their civilian constituency, but often victimize them to enforce compliance. Scholars know relatively little about how rebels strategize violence against civilians in conflicts where the rebel constituency overlaps with the government’s political support base. This gap is problematic because the rebel constituency comprises a diverse group with varying attitudinal and behavioral characteristics. Offering a novel typo…
The Legacies of Rebel Rule in Southeast Turkey
During armed conflict civilians often inhabit areas of contested governance or areas where rebel groups, NGOs, and/or criminal syndicates vie for authority and challenge the control of the state. As non-state actors confront the authority and legitimacy of the state, civilians become central players in that competition asked to uphold or undercut these alternative governance claims. In this paper we examine the long-term impact of rebel governanc…
Target Hardening and Non-State Armed Groups' Target Selection
This study explores the variation in the non-state armed group (NSAGs)'s behavior concerning target selection. Scholars of transnational terrorism have investigated transnational NSAGs' target selection. However, we are still missing out on the most common form of terrorism, terrorism perpetrated by domestic NSAGs involved in civil conflicts. This paper’s novel contribution is to the understanding of domestic NSAGs’ strategic logic. I argue that …
Signaling Resolve through Credit-claiming
What explains when militant groups claim attacks? In this study, I argue that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks early in the organization’s lifespan and after major blows to reputation like loss of a leader due to leadership decapitation. This is because credit-claiming helps militants signal resolve to a wider audience, thereby burnishing the organization’s reputation. Specifically, I argue that claims of militant attacks are cost…
The Legacies of Rebel Rule in Southeast Turkey
During armed conflict civilians often inhabit areas of contested governance or areas where rebel groups, NGOs, and/or criminal syndicates vie for authority and challenge the control of the state. As non-state actors confront the authority and legitimacy of the state, civilians become central players in that competition asked to uphold or undercut these alternative governance claims. In this paper we examine the long-term impact of rebel governanc…
Target Hardening and Non-State Armed Groups' Target Selection
This study explores the variation in the non-state armed group (NSAGs)'s behavior concerning target selection. Scholars of transnational terrorism have investigated transnational NSAGs' target selection. However, we are still missing out on the most common form of terrorism, terrorism perpetrated by domestic NSAGs involved in civil conflicts. This paper’s novel contribution is to the understanding of domestic NSAGs’ strategic logic. I argue that …
Credit claims and the survival rates of terrorist organizations
How Civilian Loyalties Shape Rebel-Led Victimization of Rebel Constituencies
Rebels rely on the support of their civilian constituency, but often victimize them to enforce compliance. Scholars know relatively little about how rebels strategize violence against civilians in conflicts where the rebel constituency overlaps with the government’s political support base. This gap is problematic because the rebel constituency comprises a diverse group with varying attitudinal and behavioral characteristics. Offering a novel typo…
Signaling Resolve through Credit-claiming
What explains when militant groups claim attacks? In this study, I argue that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks early in the organization’s lifespan and after major blows to reputation like loss of a leader due to leadership decapitation. This is because credit-claiming helps militants signal resolve to a wider audience, thereby burnishing the organization’s reputation. Specifically, I argue that claims of militant attacks are cost…
Signaling Resolve through Credit-claiming
What explains when militant groups claim attacks? In this study, I argue that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks early in the organization’s lifespan and after major blows to reputation like loss of a leader due to leadership decapitation. This is because credit-claiming helps militants signal resolve to a wider audience, thereby burnishing the organization’s reputation. Specifically, I argue that claims of militant attacks are cost…
The Legacies of Rebel Rule in Southeast Turkey
During armed conflict civilians often inhabit areas of contested governance or areas where rebel groups, NGOs, and/or criminal syndicates vie for authority and challenge the control of the state. As non-state actors confront the authority and legitimacy of the state, civilians become central players in that competition asked to uphold or undercut these alternative governance claims. In this paper we examine the long-term impact of rebel governanc…
Target Hardening and Non-State Armed Groups' Target Selection
This study explores the variation in the non-state armed group (NSAGs)'s behavior concerning target selection. Scholars of transnational terrorism have investigated transnational NSAGs' target selection. However, we are still missing out on the most common form of terrorism, terrorism perpetrated by domestic NSAGs involved in civil conflicts. This paper’s novel contribution is to the understanding of domestic NSAGs’ strategic logic. I argue that …
Credit claims and the survival rates of terrorist organizations
We have nothing to do with it
Armed groups operating in conflicts around the world publish statements of denial to dissociate themselves from acts of violence. Existing research argues that armed groups publish denial statements to avoid public backlash, favorably frame the conduct of their campaigns, and distance themselves from unsanctioned actions conducted by rank‐and‐file members. However, the broader psychological impact of denial statements on public perceptions remain…
How Civilian Loyalties Shape Rebel-Led Victimization of Rebel Constituencies
Rebels rely on the support of their civilian constituency, but often victimize them to enforce compliance. Scholars know relatively little about how rebels strategize violence against civilians in conflicts where the rebel constituency overlaps with the government’s political support base. This gap is problematic because the rebel constituency comprises a diverse group with varying attitudinal and behavioral characteristics. Offering a novel typo…
Commanders of the Mujahideen
Recent research has explored how militant leaders' backgrounds shape their decision-making while in power. However, existing studies primarily focus on leaders of rebel groups participating in civil wars, overlooking smaller, yet lethal and influential, armed groups that operate outside civil war contexts. To address this gap, we introduce the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD), which provides original, systematic data on the backgrounds and prewar e…
Introducing the Rebel Internal Governance (RIG) Dataset
s Existing research shows that rebel groups develop strategies to mitigate principal-agent problems and align the preferences of rank and file fighters with those of leaders, and that these strategies influence conflict processes. Yet, systematic cross-national data on how groups regulate fighters, foster cohesion, and punish disobedience remain absent. To address this gap, we introduce the Rebel Internal Governance (RIG) Dataset, which codes ori…
A principal–agent theory and network analysis of high-end cooperation among militant groups
This study develops a principal–agent theory of why armed groups engage in high-end cooperation involving training or intelligence. While such cooperation enhances capacity, it generates downstream risks. Principals mitigate these risks by selecting agents who are skill-wise complementary but politically non-substitutable. Agents accept high-end support when doing so does not leave them politically overshadowed by a dominant actor. Using original…
Beyond Outbidding
Numerous jihadist organizations pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (AQ) or the Islamic State (IS) in recent years. How do armed groups respond to competition from transnational jihadist rivals? A prominent strand of research argues that increased competition leads armed groups to outbid rivals through violent escalation. However, an alternative theory suggests that groups can restrain their violence to distinguish themselves from extremist rivals and…
Political Conflict and Governance (8 works) · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence (8 works) · Political science (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Militant (3 works) · Terrorism (3 works) · Business (2 works)