Commanders of the Mujahideen
Introducing the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24225167 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Maria Amjad (0000-0002-8836-0515, Leiden University), Mark Berlin (0009-0004-4608-2790, Princeton University), Sara Daub (0000-0001-5408-5239, Hertie School), Ilayda B Onder (0000-0002-5712-8131, Texas A&M University), Joshua Fawcett Weiner (0000-0002-9762-7840, Radboud University Nijmegen) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 289-297 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-23 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jopres/xjaf016 |
| OpenAlex | W7131392758 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 43 |
Recent research has explored how militant leaders' backgrounds shape their decision-making while in power. However, existing studies primarily focus on leaders of rebel groups participating in civil wars, overlooking smaller, yet lethal and influential, armed groups that operate outside civil war contexts. To address this gap, we introduce the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD), which provides original, systematic data on the backgrounds and prewar experiences of 237 leaders from 110 jihadist organizations. The dataset covers organizations operating across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East between 1976 and 2023, capturing a broad range of actors that are central to contemporary conflicts. Drawing on Arabic, English, French, German, Turkish, and Urdu sources, we document biographical information on 31 leader-level variables, offering the potential for analyzing how jihadist leaders' prior experiences shape their preferences and the behavior of the groups they command. We detail our data collection procedures and present descriptive statistics before illustrating the JLD's utility through a quantitative analysis of the leader-level determinants of suicide bombings. The JLD advances research on militant leaders, jihadist actors, and the role of individual decision-makers in shaping conflict processes and provides multiple avenues for new research on leader-level explanations of various consequential outcomes in conflict zones, including organizational splintering, tactical choices, and militant alliances.
jihadist groups · mujahideen · non-state armed groups · Suicide bombings · Terrorism · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Terror in Transition
Political instability patterns are obscured by conflict dataset scope conditions, sources, and coding choices
Divided Not Conquered
From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists
The Caravan
Deadly Clerics
Al-Qaida in Afghanistan
A Motion of No Confidence
The Politics of Risking Peace Revisited
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State's Break
Casting Shadow
When Transnationalism is not Global
The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah
Motives for Martyrdom
Targeting Top Terrorists
Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark
We Have Captured Your Women”
A theory of jihadist beheadings
Introducing ViNSAR
Leadership Targeting and Militant Alliance Breakdown
Rebel Leader Age and the Outcomes of Civil Wars
Recruiting Rebels
Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes
When Organizations Rebel
Unmasking Militants
Friends in the Profession
How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders
Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations
Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes
Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous
Organized violence, 1989-2019
Introducing Role
The Biographical Consequences of Activism
Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset
Militant Leadership and Terrorism in Armed Conflict
Introducing Archigos
Introducing the new CPOST dataset on suicide attacks
The logic of transnational outbidding
Conflict negotiations and rebel leader selection
Revolutionary days
Introducing a new dataset on leadership change in rebel groups, 1946-2010
Counterinsurgency Tactics, Rebel Grievances, and Who Keeps Fighting
| Highly cited | No |
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