Magnus Bergli Rasmussen
Biographic Data
| ID | 3594536 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Magnus Bergli Rasmussen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Magnus Bergli |
| FAMILY NAME | Rasmussen |
| SIGNATURE | RASMUSSEN M B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3664-0555 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 124 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Strikes and Machines: Investments in the Norwegian Inter-War-Period
To what extent do strike threats prompt firms to adopt capital-intensive methods to deter strikes or labor-intensive strategies to maintain flexibility during work stoppages? We introduce a theoretical model that demonstrates how threats of industrial action influence capital investments through relative factor prices and the power dynamics between workers and employers. Using newly digitized data from 3,141 industrial conflicts and collective ag…
Who Rules? Support Coalitions and Regime Survival, 1789–2020
All political regimes rely on coalitions of supporters to govern and remain in power. We discuss, specify, and test arguments pertaining to how the numerical size as well as social diversity of regime support coalitions influence regime longevity. We use recently collected data on support coalition characteristics, with global coverage and time series exceeding 230 years, and find that larger as well as more diverse regime support coalitions are …
Behind the Throne: Regime support coalitions around the world, 1789-2020
All regimes require supporters to govern and survive. We discuss the concept of a ‘regime support group’ and present and validate measures from an extensive dataset recording different features of such groups. This Regime Support and Opposition Groups (ReSOG) dataset covers approximately 2,000 political regimes from almost 200 countries, across 1789–2020. Drawing on the knowledge of about 1,000 country experts, we estimate the size and main geogr…
Cui bono? business elites and interstate conflict
We examine how regime support coalitions influence interstate conflict by revisiting the classic debate over the role of business elites in shaping states’ conflict behavior. While imperialist theories argue that business elites promote military expeditions to access new foreign markets, capitalist peace perspectives contend that these elites favor peace due to their economic interests. We reconcile these views by proposing that countries become …
The Politics of Time: The Political Origins of Working-Time Regulation
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, leisure was reserved for the few. By the end of the twentieth century, however, most workers had a regulated normal working time of 40 or fewer hours per week, annual paid leave, and overtime compensation. In this paper, I investigate which political parties brought forth these changes – which party constellations supported or opposed working-time reforms and argue that sector and class differences drive…
The great standardisation: Working hours around the world
This paper introduces a novel dataset on working-time regulation for 197 territories between 1789 and 2010 to document how working hours have become globally standardised through public policy. Descriptive analysis shows that working-time reforms are global in scope, rare events, sizable once undertaken and tend to reduce hours. Democracies were historically more likely than autocracies to regulate hours, but this is not the case now, and there h…
Laying Down The Principles: How Local Socialist Achievements Spurred National Bourgeois Support for Noncontributory Pensions
The authors develop a perspective of locally embedded welfare state development to explain how relatively weak national political actors can, nonetheless, shape national policy over time by pursuing local reforms. Empirically, the authors assess their argument by using municipality-level representative shares, data on noncontributory pension reforms, roll-call votes from parliament, and archival material from early twentieth-century Norway, in wh…
Reforming to Survive: The Bolshevik Origins of Social Policies
Farmers and the Origin of the Welfare State: Evidence from 308 Roll Call Votes between 1882 and 1940 ☆
Studies of early social policy development highlight the progressive role of farmers, especially in Scandinavian countries. I argue that this notion does not match with the role played by farmer's representatives or the party in parliament. Being ideologically committed to more market‐oriented solutions, less exposed to labour market risks and fearing for their labour supply, Farmers as a social group and party, I argue, had strong incentives to …
Revolution, Elite Fear, and Electoral Institutions
We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revoluti…
Volte-Face on the Welfare State: Social Partners, Knowledge Economies, and the Expansion of Work-Family Policies
To what extent organized employers and trade unions support social policies is contested. This article examines the case of work-family policies (WFPs), which have surged to become a central part of the welfare state. In that expansion, the joint role of employers and unions has largely been disregarded in the comparative political economy literature. The article posits that the shift from Fordist to knowledge economies is the impetus for the soc…
Suffering from Suffrage: Welfare State Development and the Politics of Citizenship Disqualification
Following the landmark essay of T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and the Social Class (1949), it has conventionally been assumed that the introduction and expansion of social rights in Europe happened as the final stage of a long process of democratization that included the granting of first civil and then political rights. We present a radically different perspective on the relationship between the extension of suffrage (under meaningful competition …
Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development
This article argues that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized shapes welfare state development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome co-ordination problems, avoid capture by special interests and form stable linkages with broad social groups. These features both enable and incentivize politicians to pursue extensive welfare policies. The study employs measures of party institutionalization and welfare sta…
Majoritarian systems, rural groups, and (arrested) welfare state development
While some scholars suggest that rural groups contribute to welfare state expansion, we highlight their incentives to restrain it. The ability of rural groups to achieve this preference hinges on their power resources, but also on the electoral system. We propose that in majoritarian systems, rural groups can often veto welfare legislation. In proportional systems this is less feasible, even for resource-rich groups. Instead, agrarian groups some…
Electoral Rules, Labor Market Coordination and Macroeconomic Performance
Two distinct literatures have studied the macroeconomic effects of electoral systems and of labor market structures, respectively. Results include a positive association between proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and growth, but also between PR and inflation, as well as negative or hump‐shaped relationships between labor market coordination and the ‘misery variables’, unemployment and inflation. However, these results could be bia…
Working-Class Strength by Institutional Design? Unionization, Partisan Politics, and Unemployment Insurance Systems, 1870 to 2010
Many studies have found that countries with union-administered unemployment insurance have higher rates of unionization than countries with state-administered unemployment insurance. With data going further back in history, this article demonstrates that the introduction of so-called “Ghent systems” had no effect on unionization rates. We argue that the Ghent effect identified by the existing literature came about as a result of increasing state …
The Autocratic Welfare State: Old-Age Pensions, Credible Commitments, and Regime Survival
In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and …
Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development
The Autocratic Welfare State Resource Distribution, Credible Commitments and Political Survival
The Autocratic Welfare State: Old-Age Pensions, Credible Commitments, and Regime Survival
In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and …
Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development
This article argues that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized shapes welfare state development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome co-ordination problems, avoid capture by special interests and form stable linkages with broad social groups. These features both enable and incentivize politicians to pursue extensive welfare policies. The study employs measures of party institutionalization and welfare sta…
Working-Class Strength by Institutional Design? Unionization, Partisan Politics, and Unemployment Insurance Systems, 1870 to 2010
Many studies have found that countries with union-administered unemployment insurance have higher rates of unionization than countries with state-administered unemployment insurance. With data going further back in history, this article demonstrates that the introduction of so-called “Ghent systems” had no effect on unionization rates. We argue that the Ghent effect identified by the existing literature came about as a result of increasing state …
Volte-Face on the Welfare State: Social Partners, Knowledge Economies, and the Expansion of Work-Family Policies
To what extent organized employers and trade unions support social policies is contested. This article examines the case of work-family policies (WFPs), which have surged to become a central part of the welfare state. In that expansion, the joint role of employers and unions has largely been disregarded in the comparative political economy literature. The article posits that the shift from Fordist to knowledge economies is the impetus for the soc…
Revolution, Elite Fear, and Electoral Institutions
We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revoluti…
Behind the Throne: Regime support coalitions around the world, 1789-2020
All regimes require supporters to govern and survive. We discuss the concept of a ‘regime support group’ and present and validate measures from an extensive dataset recording different features of such groups. This Regime Support and Opposition Groups (ReSOG) dataset covers approximately 2,000 political regimes from almost 200 countries, across 1789–2020. Drawing on the knowledge of about 1,000 country experts, we estimate the size and main geogr…
Who Rules? Support Coalitions and Regime Survival, 1789–2020
All political regimes rely on coalitions of supporters to govern and remain in power. We discuss, specify, and test arguments pertaining to how the numerical size as well as social diversity of regime support coalitions influence regime longevity. We use recently collected data on support coalition characteristics, with global coverage and time series exceeding 230 years, and find that larger as well as more diverse regime support coalitions are …
Laying Down The Principles: How Local Socialist Achievements Spurred National Bourgeois Support for Noncontributory Pensions
The authors develop a perspective of locally embedded welfare state development to explain how relatively weak national political actors can, nonetheless, shape national policy over time by pursuing local reforms. Empirically, the authors assess their argument by using municipality-level representative shares, data on noncontributory pension reforms, roll-call votes from parliament, and archival material from early twentieth-century Norway, in wh…
Majoritarian systems, rural groups, and (arrested) welfare state development
While some scholars suggest that rural groups contribute to welfare state expansion, we highlight their incentives to restrain it. The ability of rural groups to achieve this preference hinges on their power resources, but also on the electoral system. We propose that in majoritarian systems, rural groups can often veto welfare legislation. In proportional systems this is less feasible, even for resource-rich groups. Instead, agrarian groups some…
The Politics of Time: The Political Origins of Working-Time Regulation
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, leisure was reserved for the few. By the end of the twentieth century, however, most workers had a regulated normal working time of 40 or fewer hours per week, annual paid leave, and overtime compensation. In this paper, I investigate which political parties brought forth these changes – which party constellations supported or opposed working-time reforms and argue that sector and class differences drive…
Farmers and the Origin of the Welfare State: Evidence from 308 Roll Call Votes between 1882 and 1940 ☆
Studies of early social policy development highlight the progressive role of farmers, especially in Scandinavian countries. I argue that this notion does not match with the role played by farmer's representatives or the party in parliament. Being ideologically committed to more market‐oriented solutions, less exposed to labour market risks and fearing for their labour supply, Farmers as a social group and party, I argue, had strong incentives to …
The Autocratic Welfare State Resource Distribution, Credible Commitments and Political Survival
Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development
Electoral Rules, Labor Market Coordination and Macroeconomic Performance
Two distinct literatures have studied the macroeconomic effects of electoral systems and of labor market structures, respectively. Results include a positive association between proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and growth, but also between PR and inflation, as well as negative or hump‐shaped relationships between labor market coordination and the ‘misery variables’, unemployment and inflation. However, these results could be bia…
Working-Class Strength by Institutional Design? Unionization, Partisan Politics, and Unemployment Insurance Systems, 1870 to 2010
Many studies have found that countries with union-administered unemployment insurance have higher rates of unionization than countries with state-administered unemployment insurance. With data going further back in history, this article demonstrates that the introduction of so-called “Ghent systems” had no effect on unionization rates. We argue that the Ghent effect identified by the existing literature came about as a result of increasing state …
The Autocratic Welfare State: Old-Age Pensions, Credible Commitments, and Regime Survival
In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and …
Majoritarian systems, rural groups, and (arrested) welfare state development
While some scholars suggest that rural groups contribute to welfare state expansion, we highlight their incentives to restrain it. The ability of rural groups to achieve this preference hinges on their power resources, but also on the electoral system. We propose that in majoritarian systems, rural groups can often veto welfare legislation. In proportional systems this is less feasible, even for resource-rich groups. Instead, agrarian groups some…
Suffering from Suffrage: Welfare State Development and the Politics of Citizenship Disqualification
Following the landmark essay of T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and the Social Class (1949), it has conventionally been assumed that the introduction and expansion of social rights in Europe happened as the final stage of a long process of democratization that included the granting of first civil and then political rights. We present a radically different perspective on the relationship between the extension of suffrage (under meaningful competition …
Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development
This article argues that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized shapes welfare state development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome co-ordination problems, avoid capture by special interests and form stable linkages with broad social groups. These features both enable and incentivize politicians to pursue extensive welfare policies. The study employs measures of party institutionalization and welfare sta…
Farmers and the Origin of the Welfare State: Evidence from 308 Roll Call Votes between 1882 and 1940 ☆
Studies of early social policy development highlight the progressive role of farmers, especially in Scandinavian countries. I argue that this notion does not match with the role played by farmer's representatives or the party in parliament. Being ideologically committed to more market‐oriented solutions, less exposed to labour market risks and fearing for their labour supply, Farmers as a social group and party, I argue, had strong incentives to …
Revolution, Elite Fear, and Electoral Institutions
We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revoluti…
Volte-Face on the Welfare State: Social Partners, Knowledge Economies, and the Expansion of Work-Family Policies
To what extent organized employers and trade unions support social policies is contested. This article examines the case of work-family policies (WFPs), which have surged to become a central part of the welfare state. In that expansion, the joint role of employers and unions has largely been disregarded in the comparative political economy literature. The article posits that the shift from Fordist to knowledge economies is the impetus for the soc…
Reforming to Survive: The Bolshevik Origins of Social Policies
The Politics of Time: The Political Origins of Working-Time Regulation
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, leisure was reserved for the few. By the end of the twentieth century, however, most workers had a regulated normal working time of 40 or fewer hours per week, annual paid leave, and overtime compensation. In this paper, I investigate which political parties brought forth these changes – which party constellations supported or opposed working-time reforms and argue that sector and class differences drive…
The great standardisation: Working hours around the world
This paper introduces a novel dataset on working-time regulation for 197 territories between 1789 and 2010 to document how working hours have become globally standardised through public policy. Descriptive analysis shows that working-time reforms are global in scope, rare events, sizable once undertaken and tend to reduce hours. Democracies were historically more likely than autocracies to regulate hours, but this is not the case now, and there h…
Laying Down The Principles: How Local Socialist Achievements Spurred National Bourgeois Support for Noncontributory Pensions
The authors develop a perspective of locally embedded welfare state development to explain how relatively weak national political actors can, nonetheless, shape national policy over time by pursuing local reforms. Empirically, the authors assess their argument by using municipality-level representative shares, data on noncontributory pension reforms, roll-call votes from parliament, and archival material from early twentieth-century Norway, in wh…
Who Rules? Support Coalitions and Regime Survival, 1789–2020
All political regimes rely on coalitions of supporters to govern and remain in power. We discuss, specify, and test arguments pertaining to how the numerical size as well as social diversity of regime support coalitions influence regime longevity. We use recently collected data on support coalition characteristics, with global coverage and time series exceeding 230 years, and find that larger as well as more diverse regime support coalitions are …
Behind the Throne: Regime support coalitions around the world, 1789-2020
All regimes require supporters to govern and survive. We discuss the concept of a ‘regime support group’ and present and validate measures from an extensive dataset recording different features of such groups. This Regime Support and Opposition Groups (ReSOG) dataset covers approximately 2,000 political regimes from almost 200 countries, across 1789–2020. Drawing on the knowledge of about 1,000 country experts, we estimate the size and main geogr…
Cui bono? business elites and interstate conflict
We examine how regime support coalitions influence interstate conflict by revisiting the classic debate over the role of business elites in shaping states’ conflict behavior. While imperialist theories argue that business elites promote military expeditions to access new foreign markets, capitalist peace perspectives contend that these elites favor peace due to their economic interests. We reconcile these views by proposing that countries become …
Strikes and Machines: Investments in the Norwegian Inter-War-Period
To what extent do strike threats prompt firms to adopt capital-intensive methods to deter strikes or labor-intensive strategies to maintain flexibility during work stoppages? We introduce a theoretical model that demonstrates how threats of industrial action influence capital investments through relative factor prices and the power dynamics between workers and employers. Using newly digitized data from 3,141 industrial conflicts and collective ag…
Political science (17 works) · Law (15 works) · Politics (15 works) · Social Policy and Reform Studies (15 works) · Economics (14 works) · Law (11 works) · Political economy (9 works) · Welfare state (8 works) · Labor Movements and Unions (7 works) · State (computer science (7 works)