Daniel Drucker
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866260 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Drucker |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Drucker |
| SIGNATURE | DRUCKER D |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6075-1170 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Attitudes, conditional and general
The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism
Some attitudes we usually do not have
I present a new attitude puzzle involving disjunction. Specifically, though it can sound strange to ascribe the belief that or when and are about very different subject‐matters, we can assure ourselves that the strangeness is merely pragmatic because of the alethic properties of disjunction. But frustration‐ and other non‐doxastic attitude‐ascriptions also sound very strange. Are the corresponding frustratingness, etc. properties of disjunction t…
Attitudes as positions
In these comments on David Hunter’s insightful new book On Believing, I consider Hunter’s account of believing that p as being in a position to act in light of the fact (or apparent fact) that p. After investigating how this kind of view is supposed to work, I raise a challenge for it: the account is unlikely to generalize to other attitudes like hoping and fearing that p. I then argue that this really is an objection to the account of believing,…
Reasoning beyond belief acquisition
I argue that we can reason not only to new beliefs but to basically any change in attitude we can think of, including the abandonment of belief (contra John Broome), the acquisition of non‐belief attitudes like relief and admiration, and the elimination of the same. To argue for this position, which I call generalism, I defend a sufficient condition on reasoning, roughly that we can reason to any change in attitude that is expressed by the conclu…
Changes in attitude
While it's hard to judge proportions here, I'd say most epistemic requirements philosophers propose relate doxastic attitudes of the same given type.Here are two picked somewhat at random (note that I don't necessarily endorse them).Modus Ponens Requirement.Rationality requires of N that, if N believes at t that p, and N believes at t that if p then q, and if N cares at t whether q, then N believes at t that q. 1 Diachronic Conditionalization (na…
The Attitudes We Can Have
This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, and so on, do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as h…
Policy Externalism
I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non‐doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argumen…
The Attitudes We Can Have
This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, and so on, do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as h…
Policy Externalism
I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non‐doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argumen…
Policy Externalism
I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non‐doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argumen…
The Attitudes We Can Have
This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, and so on, do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as h…
Changes in attitude
While it's hard to judge proportions here, I'd say most epistemic requirements philosophers propose relate doxastic attitudes of the same given type.Here are two picked somewhat at random (note that I don't necessarily endorse them).Modus Ponens Requirement.Rationality requires of N that, if N believes at t that p, and N believes at t that if p then q, and if N cares at t whether q, then N believes at t that q. 1 Diachronic Conditionalization (na…
Reasoning beyond belief acquisition
I argue that we can reason not only to new beliefs but to basically any change in attitude we can think of, including the abandonment of belief (contra John Broome), the acquisition of non‐belief attitudes like relief and admiration, and the elimination of the same. To argue for this position, which I call generalism, I defend a sufficient condition on reasoning, roughly that we can reason to any change in attitude that is expressed by the conclu…
Attitudes as positions
In these comments on David Hunter’s insightful new book On Believing, I consider Hunter’s account of believing that p as being in a position to act in light of the fact (or apparent fact) that p. After investigating how this kind of view is supposed to work, I raise a challenge for it: the account is unlikely to generalize to other attitudes like hoping and fearing that p. I then argue that this really is an objection to the account of believing,…
Attitudes, conditional and general
The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism
Some attitudes we usually do not have
I present a new attitude puzzle involving disjunction. Specifically, though it can sound strange to ascribe the belief that or when and are about very different subject‐matters, we can assure ourselves that the strangeness is merely pragmatic because of the alethic properties of disjunction. But frustration‐ and other non‐doxastic attitude‐ascriptions also sound very strange. Are the corresponding frustratingness, etc. properties of disjunction t…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Doxastic logic (4 works) · Admiration (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works)