Attitudes as positions

Bibliographic Data

ID21335599
AuthorsDaniel Drucker (0000-0001-6075-1170, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume67
Issue8
Pages2463-2475
Publication date2024-09-13
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2024.2325625
OpenAlexW4392375696
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited18

In these comments on David Hunter’s insightful new book On Believing, I consider Hunter’s account of believing that p as being in a position to act in light of the fact (or apparent fact) that p. After investigating how this kind of view is supposed to work, I raise a challenge for it: the account is unlikely to generalize to other attitudes like hoping and fearing that p. I then argue that this really is an objection to the account of believing, since all the attitudes have so many fundamental features in common that there should be a common core to the accounts of all the different attitudes. Since hoping and fearing that p in no way even commit the speaker to the belief that p, they can’t allow the agent to act in light of the (apparent) fact that p. Thus, I conclude, believing isn’t a matter of being in such a position, and neither is the having of any other type of attitude

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access