The Attitudes We Can Have

Bibliographic Data

ID10696411
AuthorsDaniel Drucker (0000-0001-6075-1170, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume129
Issue4
Pages591-642
Publication date2020-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-8540931
OpenAlexW3111241065
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited59

This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, and so on, do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and admiration. And third, even for non-doxastic attitudes like that, not just any description will allow it. The article argues that one should think of attitude formation like one does (practical) choices among options. The article motivates this view linguistically, extending “relevant alternatives” theories of the attitudes to both belief and to the other, non-doxastic attitudes. Given a natural principle governing choice, and some important differences between doxastic and non-doxastic “choices,” one can explain these puzzling phenomena

Admiration · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Natural (archaeology) · Proposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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