Anthony J Madonna
Biographic Data
| ID | 4122799 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anthony J Madonna |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anthony J |
| FAMILY NAME | Madonna |
| SIGNATURE | MADONNA A J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Georgia |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 128 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
The 1976 House Majority Leadership Contest: Stepping Stone in the Transition to Conditional Party Government by Bruce I. Oppenheimer and Robert L. Peabody
Interbranch Warfare: Senate Amending Process and Restrictive House Rules
While the U.S. House and Senate differ in many significant ways, perhaps the most important is the ability of House leaders to control the legislative process through the usage of special rules, which establish the terms of debate on a bill and can limit the number and content of amendments allowed. House members of both the majority and minority party have complained about their recent increased usage. In contrast, the Senate lacks a comparable …
Questions of Order in the U.S. Senate: Procedural Uncertainty and the Role of the Parliamentarian
Objectives Scholarship on the U.S. Senate has demonstrated the pivotal role the presiding officer can play when asked to interpret the chamber's rules and precedents. Therefore, our objective is to broadly evaluate how questions of order are arbitrated in the U.S. Senate. Methods Using a multinomial logistic regression, we estimate the effect of partisanship on adjudicating questions of order in the Senate before and after the institutionalizatio…
The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design
The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate gives procedural control of the Senate to an individual who is not elected by the chamber. We argue that because the vice president frequently acts against the wishes of Senate majorities, senators have been reluctant to allow chamber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has had a major influence on Senate developmen…
No vacancy: Holdover Capacity and the Continued Staffing of Major Commissions
Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a…
Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage: The Impact of Supreme Court Nominations on Presidential Success in the U.S. Senate
Presidents often see a Supreme Court nomination as an opportunity to leave a lasting mark on policy. Recent studies speculate that focusing on Supreme Court nominees affects presidential success beyond the confirmation process, but this has not been established systematically. We develop and test a hypothesis stating that presidents who get into a battle to promote a controversial Supreme Court nominee will see delays and failures in their effort…
The Cost of Majority‐Party Bias: Amending Activity under Structured Rules
All major legislation in the House necessitates a special rule from the Rules Committee before it can be brought to the chamber floor. These rules often strictly limit floor amendments to bills considered by the House. Scholars of political parties have argued that the House majority party can bias policy output away from the floor median through its usage of restrictive rules. In this article, we argue that in order to secure the passage of rest…
Regulating the Floor: Tabling Motions in the U.S. Senate, 1865-1946
The motion to table plays a prominent role in many scholarly accounts of policymaking in the Senate. Scholars have argued that it is used with several other motions to allow majority party leaders to bias policy outcomes on the chamber floor. Others maintain it provides bill managers with a means of more efficiently managing the floor. We examine how the motion was utilized both prior to and during the development of Senate floor leadership. Our …
New Directions in Legislative Research: Lessons from Inside Congress
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Nuclear Fallout: Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on Judicial Nominations
On November 21, 2013, U.S. Senate Democrats utilized the long threatened “nuclear option,” thereby allowing a simple-majority of the chamber to end debate on lower federal court judicial nominations. Formal theory predicts that this change should permit the president to nominate more ideologically extreme nominees. By comparing President Obama’s nominees before and after the Senate’s change to the confirmation process, we are able to provide the …
The Establishment of Party Policy Committees in the U.S. Senate: Coordination, Not Coercion
Objective We seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intraparty coordination influenced observed levels of party unity in the U.S. Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Methods First, we examine Congress at the vote level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be cl…
Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era
In recent years, judicial nominations to lower federal courts have been blocked privately by negative blue slips returned by home state senators. We examine the conditions under which senators return negative blue slips and discover two results. First, consistent with existing work, ideology plays a strong role in blue slipping. Second, and more important, we find that nominee qualifications mitigate ideological extremism—but only for district co…
Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress
Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both th…
Apsa Fellowship with the Congressional Research Service: Congressional Fellowship Program
Serving as an APSA Congressional Fellow had been a goal of mine since I started graduate school. The fellowship provided an opportunity to examine the congressional policy-making process first hand. And while I had worked on congressional campaigns, in state legislative offices, and supervised student internships, I had no direct experience working on Capitol Hill for Congress. In addition, the program was highly recommended by senior colleagues …
Viva Voce: Implications from the Disappearing Voice Vote, 1865–1996
Objective Congressional votes are only recorded if a member formally requests a roll call vote, and that request is supported by one‐fifth of those present. Many votes pass viva voce and are never recorded. We seek to examine changing patterns of unrecorded voting, analyze the causes of these changes, and consider the implications of these changes for congressional scholars. Methods Using landmark legislation from the 39th (1865–1867) to the 104t…
The Floor in Congressional Life
Journal Article The Floor in Congressional Life Get access The Floor in Congressional Life by Andrew J. Taylor. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2012. 264 pp. $70.00. Anthony Madonna Anthony Madonna The University of Georgia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 128, Issue 2, Summer 2013, Pages 376–377, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12054 Published: 23 July 2013
Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945
Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordinat…
Partisan brand name building and deficit politics: Examining the Role of Power Sharing on Party Issue Consistency
Scholars of political parties frequently note that a party's candidates are aided by the presence of a consistent and favourable party brand name. We argue that partisan success in maintaining a consistent position on important policy issues hinges on how their role in the government motivates their strategies about public policy formation. Specifically, when parties share control of government institutions, parties need to balance their electora…
Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change
Recent empirical work has brought a renewed attention to the effect congressional rules of procedure have on the size of winning coalitions. Specifically, scholars have posited that legislative success hinges on the support of legislators identified by institutionally defined decision rules. Under these theories, supermajority decision rules in the U.S. Senate lead to larger, more inclusive coalitions on final passage. In this article, I reevalua…
Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presidential Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments
In 2007, the U.S. Senate moved into permanent session to stop President George W. Bush from making recess appointments. This article examines this episode. We argue that Congress is only able to effectively check presidential unilateral powers when the president's use of such powers creates high political costs for a sufficient number of members such that congressional collective action is possible. Using case studies and multivariate analysis, w…
Coalition Formation in the House and Senate: Examining the Effect of Institutional Change on Major Legislation
We investigate various theories of legislative coalition formation in a bicameral context. More specifically, we employ a quasi-experimental design to examine the size of coalitions in both the House and Senate across the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This offers us considerable analytical leverage in investigating how changes in key institutional decision rules (the adoption of the Reed’s Rules in the House and the passage of cl…
Adding Recess Appointments to the President's “Tool Chest” of Unilateral Powers
In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appointment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess ap…
Going Nuclear, Senate Style
Conflict within and beyond the United States Senate has refocused scholarly and public attention on "advice and consent," the constitutional provision that governs the Senate's role in confirming presidential appointments. Despite intense and salient partisan and ideological disputes about the rules of the game that govern the Senate confirmation process for judicial appointees, reformers have had little success in limiting the ability of a minor…
Going Nuclear, Senate Style
Conflict within and beyond the United States Senate has refocused scholarly and public attention on "advice and consent," the constitutional provision that governs the Senate's role in confirming presidential appointments. Despite intense and salient partisan and ideological disputes about the rules of the game that govern the Senate confirmation process for judicial appointees, reformers have had little success in limiting the ability of a minor…
Adding Recess Appointments to the President's “Tool Chest” of Unilateral Powers
In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appointment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess ap…
Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage: The Impact of Supreme Court Nominations on Presidential Success in the U.S. Senate
Presidents often see a Supreme Court nomination as an opportunity to leave a lasting mark on policy. Recent studies speculate that focusing on Supreme Court nominees affects presidential success beyond the confirmation process, but this has not been established systematically. We develop and test a hypothesis stating that presidents who get into a battle to promote a controversial Supreme Court nominee will see delays and failures in their effort…
The Cost of Majority‐Party Bias: Amending Activity under Structured Rules
All major legislation in the House necessitates a special rule from the Rules Committee before it can be brought to the chamber floor. These rules often strictly limit floor amendments to bills considered by the House. Scholars of political parties have argued that the House majority party can bias policy output away from the floor median through its usage of restrictive rules. In this article, we argue that in order to secure the passage of rest…
Viva Voce: Implications from the Disappearing Voice Vote, 1865–1996
Objective Congressional votes are only recorded if a member formally requests a roll call vote, and that request is supported by one‐fifth of those present. Many votes pass viva voce and are never recorded. We seek to examine changing patterns of unrecorded voting, analyze the causes of these changes, and consider the implications of these changes for congressional scholars. Methods Using landmark legislation from the 39th (1865–1867) to the 104t…
Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presidential Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments
In 2007, the U.S. Senate moved into permanent session to stop President George W. Bush from making recess appointments. This article examines this episode. We argue that Congress is only able to effectively check presidential unilateral powers when the president's use of such powers creates high political costs for a sufficient number of members such that congressional collective action is possible. Using case studies and multivariate analysis, w…
Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress
Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both th…
Nuclear Fallout: Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on Judicial Nominations
On November 21, 2013, U.S. Senate Democrats utilized the long threatened “nuclear option,” thereby allowing a simple-majority of the chamber to end debate on lower federal court judicial nominations. Formal theory predicts that this change should permit the president to nominate more ideologically extreme nominees. By comparing President Obama’s nominees before and after the Senate’s change to the confirmation process, we are able to provide the …
Coalition Formation in the House and Senate: Examining the Effect of Institutional Change on Major Legislation
We investigate various theories of legislative coalition formation in a bicameral context. More specifically, we employ a quasi-experimental design to examine the size of coalitions in both the House and Senate across the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This offers us considerable analytical leverage in investigating how changes in key institutional decision rules (the adoption of the Reed’s Rules in the House and the passage of cl…
The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design
The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate gives procedural control of the Senate to an individual who is not elected by the chamber. We argue that because the vice president frequently acts against the wishes of Senate majorities, senators have been reluctant to allow chamber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has had a major influence on Senate developmen…
Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era
In recent years, judicial nominations to lower federal courts have been blocked privately by negative blue slips returned by home state senators. We examine the conditions under which senators return negative blue slips and discover two results. First, consistent with existing work, ideology plays a strong role in blue slipping. Second, and more important, we find that nominee qualifications mitigate ideological extremism—but only for district co…
Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945
Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordinat…
No vacancy: Holdover Capacity and the Continued Staffing of Major Commissions
Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a…
Regulating the Floor: Tabling Motions in the U.S. Senate, 1865-1946
The motion to table plays a prominent role in many scholarly accounts of policymaking in the Senate. Scholars have argued that it is used with several other motions to allow majority party leaders to bias policy outcomes on the chamber floor. Others maintain it provides bill managers with a means of more efficiently managing the floor. We examine how the motion was utilized both prior to and during the development of Senate floor leadership. Our …
Partisan brand name building and deficit politics: Examining the Role of Power Sharing on Party Issue Consistency
Scholars of political parties frequently note that a party's candidates are aided by the presence of a consistent and favourable party brand name. We argue that partisan success in maintaining a consistent position on important policy issues hinges on how their role in the government motivates their strategies about public policy formation. Specifically, when parties share control of government institutions, parties need to balance their electora…
New Directions in Legislative Research: Lessons from Inside Congress
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Establishment of Party Policy Committees in the U.S. Senate: Coordination, Not Coercion
Objective We seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intraparty coordination influenced observed levels of party unity in the U.S. Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Methods First, we examine Congress at the vote level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be cl…
Adding Recess Appointments to the President's “Tool Chest” of Unilateral Powers
In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appointment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess ap…
Going Nuclear, Senate Style
Conflict within and beyond the United States Senate has refocused scholarly and public attention on "advice and consent," the constitutional provision that governs the Senate's role in confirming presidential appointments. Despite intense and salient partisan and ideological disputes about the rules of the game that govern the Senate confirmation process for judicial appointees, reformers have had little success in limiting the ability of a minor…
Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change
Recent empirical work has brought a renewed attention to the effect congressional rules of procedure have on the size of winning coalitions. Specifically, scholars have posited that legislative success hinges on the support of legislators identified by institutionally defined decision rules. Under these theories, supermajority decision rules in the U.S. Senate lead to larger, more inclusive coalitions on final passage. In this article, I reevalua…
Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presidential Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments
In 2007, the U.S. Senate moved into permanent session to stop President George W. Bush from making recess appointments. This article examines this episode. We argue that Congress is only able to effectively check presidential unilateral powers when the president's use of such powers creates high political costs for a sufficient number of members such that congressional collective action is possible. Using case studies and multivariate analysis, w…
Coalition Formation in the House and Senate: Examining the Effect of Institutional Change on Major Legislation
We investigate various theories of legislative coalition formation in a bicameral context. More specifically, we employ a quasi-experimental design to examine the size of coalitions in both the House and Senate across the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This offers us considerable analytical leverage in investigating how changes in key institutional decision rules (the adoption of the Reed’s Rules in the House and the passage of cl…
Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress
Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both th…
Apsa Fellowship with the Congressional Research Service: Congressional Fellowship Program
Serving as an APSA Congressional Fellow had been a goal of mine since I started graduate school. The fellowship provided an opportunity to examine the congressional policy-making process first hand. And while I had worked on congressional campaigns, in state legislative offices, and supervised student internships, I had no direct experience working on Capitol Hill for Congress. In addition, the program was highly recommended by senior colleagues …
Viva Voce: Implications from the Disappearing Voice Vote, 1865–1996
Objective Congressional votes are only recorded if a member formally requests a roll call vote, and that request is supported by one‐fifth of those present. Many votes pass viva voce and are never recorded. We seek to examine changing patterns of unrecorded voting, analyze the causes of these changes, and consider the implications of these changes for congressional scholars. Methods Using landmark legislation from the 39th (1865–1867) to the 104t…
The Floor in Congressional Life
Journal Article The Floor in Congressional Life Get access The Floor in Congressional Life by Andrew J. Taylor. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2012. 264 pp. $70.00. Anthony Madonna Anthony Madonna The University of Georgia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 128, Issue 2, Summer 2013, Pages 376–377, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12054 Published: 23 July 2013
Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945
Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordinat…
Partisan brand name building and deficit politics: Examining the Role of Power Sharing on Party Issue Consistency
Scholars of political parties frequently note that a party's candidates are aided by the presence of a consistent and favourable party brand name. We argue that partisan success in maintaining a consistent position on important policy issues hinges on how their role in the government motivates their strategies about public policy formation. Specifically, when parties share control of government institutions, parties need to balance their electora…
Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era
In recent years, judicial nominations to lower federal courts have been blocked privately by negative blue slips returned by home state senators. We examine the conditions under which senators return negative blue slips and discover two results. First, consistent with existing work, ideology plays a strong role in blue slipping. Second, and more important, we find that nominee qualifications mitigate ideological extremism—but only for district co…
Nuclear Fallout: Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on Judicial Nominations
On November 21, 2013, U.S. Senate Democrats utilized the long threatened “nuclear option,” thereby allowing a simple-majority of the chamber to end debate on lower federal court judicial nominations. Formal theory predicts that this change should permit the president to nominate more ideologically extreme nominees. By comparing President Obama’s nominees before and after the Senate’s change to the confirmation process, we are able to provide the …
The Establishment of Party Policy Committees in the U.S. Senate: Coordination, Not Coercion
Objective We seek to determine if institutional changes designed to increase intraparty coordination influenced observed levels of party unity in the U.S. Senate. In particular, we test competing claims regarding the effects of establishing party policy committees following the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Methods First, we examine Congress at the vote level by looking at the overall proportion of votes that could be cl…
Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage: The Impact of Supreme Court Nominations on Presidential Success in the U.S. Senate
Presidents often see a Supreme Court nomination as an opportunity to leave a lasting mark on policy. Recent studies speculate that focusing on Supreme Court nominees affects presidential success beyond the confirmation process, but this has not been established systematically. We develop and test a hypothesis stating that presidents who get into a battle to promote a controversial Supreme Court nominee will see delays and failures in their effort…
The Cost of Majority‐Party Bias: Amending Activity under Structured Rules
All major legislation in the House necessitates a special rule from the Rules Committee before it can be brought to the chamber floor. These rules often strictly limit floor amendments to bills considered by the House. Scholars of political parties have argued that the House majority party can bias policy output away from the floor median through its usage of restrictive rules. In this article, we argue that in order to secure the passage of rest…
Regulating the Floor: Tabling Motions in the U.S. Senate, 1865-1946
The motion to table plays a prominent role in many scholarly accounts of policymaking in the Senate. Scholars have argued that it is used with several other motions to allow majority party leaders to bias policy outcomes on the chamber floor. Others maintain it provides bill managers with a means of more efficiently managing the floor. We examine how the motion was utilized both prior to and during the development of Senate floor leadership. Our …
New Directions in Legislative Research: Lessons from Inside Congress
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
No vacancy: Holdover Capacity and the Continued Staffing of Major Commissions
Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a…
The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design
The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate gives procedural control of the Senate to an individual who is not elected by the chamber. We argue that because the vice president frequently acts against the wishes of Senate majorities, senators have been reluctant to allow chamber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has had a major influence on Senate developmen…
Questions of Order in the U.S. Senate: Procedural Uncertainty and the Role of the Parliamentarian
Objectives Scholarship on the U.S. Senate has demonstrated the pivotal role the presiding officer can play when asked to interpret the chamber's rules and precedents. Therefore, our objective is to broadly evaluate how questions of order are arbitrated in the U.S. Senate. Methods Using a multinomial logistic regression, we estimate the effect of partisanship on adjudicating questions of order in the Senate before and after the institutionalizatio…
Interbranch Warfare: Senate Amending Process and Restrictive House Rules
While the U.S. House and Senate differ in many significant ways, perhaps the most important is the ability of House leaders to control the legislative process through the usage of special rules, which establish the terms of debate on a bill and can limit the number and content of amendments allowed. House members of both the majority and minority party have complained about their recent increased usage. In contrast, the Senate lacks a comparable …
The 1976 House Majority Leadership Contest: Stepping Stone in the Transition to Conditional Party Government by Bruce I. Oppenheimer and Robert L. Peabody
Political science (22 works) · Law (21 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (18 works) · Law (16 works) · Public Administration (16 works) · Politics (15 works) · Public Administration (12 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (11 works) · Economics (10 works)