Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage

The Impact of Supreme Court Nominations on Presidential Success in the U.S. Senate

Bibliographic Data

ID6340458
AuthorsAnthony J Madonna (University of Georgia, Athens, USA), James E Monogan (0000-0002-1968-6052, University of Georgia, Athens, USA, corresponding author), Richard L Vining (0000-0001-5769-6289, University of Georgia, Athens, USA)
Year2016
Volume69
Issue4
Pages746-759
Publication date2016-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912916658128
OpenAlexW2486081284
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited44

Presidents often see a Supreme Court nomination as an opportunity to leave a lasting mark on policy. Recent studies speculate that focusing on Supreme Court nominees affects presidential success beyond the confirmation process, but this has not been established systematically. We develop and test a hypothesis stating that presidents who get into a battle to promote a controversial Supreme Court nominee will see delays and failures in their efforts to promote their legislative agenda in the Senate and fill lower level judicial vacancies. We test our theory using data on presidential policy agenda items from 1967 to 2010 and lower level judicial nominations from 1977 to 2010. We find that increased efforts in promoting confirmation reduce the likelihood of timely Senate approval of important policy proposals and nominees to federal district courts

Battle · Legislative process · Legislature · Nomination · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Supreme court · Supreme Court Decisions · Test (biology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration

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