The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations
A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231671 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bryon J Moraski, Bryon Moraski (0000-0001-9344-4548), Charles R Shipan (0000-0002-1348-5479) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1069 |
| Publication date | 1999-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2991818 |
| OpenAlex | W2321372108 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 118 |
| References cited | 16 |
When a vacancy occurs on the Supreme Court, the president can attempt to use his power of nomination strategically in order to bring the Court in line with his own policy preferences. However, the president faces two constraints when attempting to do so. First, he may be constrained by the presence of continuing justices and the existing Court median. Second, he may be constrained by the Senate, which must approve his nominee. In this paper we develop and test a theory that examines the conditions under which a president is constrained in his choice of a nominee. Our results show that presidents can, and do, behave strategically with respect to Supreme Court nominations
Economics · Law and economics · Nomination · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Supreme court · Test (biology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies
The Judicial Common Space
The American Congress
The New Separation‐of‐Powers Approach to American Politics
The Political Economy of the US Presidency
Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting
Courts under Constraints
Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court
Presidential Selection of Supreme Court Nominees
O senado e as aprovações de autoridades
Keeping the Outliers in Line? Judicial Review of State Laws by the U.S. Supreme Court
Nuclear Fallout
Executives Strike Back
Binders Full of Judges
The Purpose of Senatorial Grandstanding during Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings
Analyzing the Rhetoric of Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings
Forecasting the Senate vote on the Supreme Court vacancy
Analysing constitutional reform in Britain
Beyond Judicialization
The Impact of Divided Government on the Supreme Court Appointment Process
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
A Regression Discontinuity Design for Studying Divided Government
May It Please the Senate
Changing Senate Norms
Democratic Representation of all “the People”
Rethinking Regime Politics
Presidents, Political Regimes, and Contentious Supreme Court Nominations
Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations
Choosing When to Choose
Presidential Decision Making and Minority Nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals
The Power of Presidential Partisanship
Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presidential Powers
Prioritizing Judicial Nominations after Presidential Transitions
Agreeable Administrators? Analyzing the Public Positions of Cabinet Secretaries and Presidents
The Revolution in Presidential Studies
Studying the Polarized Presidency
Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era
Political Context, White House Centralization, and the Timing of Presidential Nominations to the Federal Courts
Presidential Success in Supreme Court Appointments
The Legislative Design of Judicial Review
Storable votes and judicial nominations in the US Senate
Justice Bork, or, be careful which supreme court nominees you choose to fight
Shaping the Federal Courts
Policy Making and Appointments under Electoral and Judicial Constraints
Whose trade follows the flag? Institutional constraints and economic responses to bilateral relations
Los conflictos intergubernamentales entre España y Cataluña
Vou indicar quem toma cerveja comigo
Taking It to the Next Level
Advice and Consent
Replacing Sandra Day O'Connor
Representative Appointments
To Advise and Consent
Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate
Judicial Majoritarianism
Checking the Federal Courts
Predicting Drift on Politically Insulated Institutions
Recruitment of Chief Justices on State Supreme Courts
Legal Institutions and Democratic Survival
Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees
The Power to Appoint
Voting for Justices
Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process
Case selection and Supreme Court pivots
Institutions, Interests, and Judicial Outcomes
The Timing of Presidential Nominations to the Lower Federal Courts
Ignoring Advice and Consent? The Uses of Judicial Recess Appointments
Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage
The Politics of Requesting Appointments
From Consent to Advice and Consent
Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers
Adding Recess Appointments to the President's “Tool Chest” of Unilateral Powers
The Effects of Information on the Accuracy of Presidential Assessments of Supreme Court Nominee Preferences
A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789–1992
Partisan Politics
Senator Opposition to Supreme Court Nominations
Judicial Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
Appointment Politics and the Ideological Composition of the Judiciary
The Senatorial Courtesy Game
Female and Minority Judicial Nominees
The Limits of Senatorial Courtesy
Divided We Quarrel
Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process
Vacancies, vetting, and votes
Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments
While there’s a breath in my body
How uncertainty about judicial nominees can distort the confirmation process
Rational incompetence
Appointee vacancies in US executive branch agencies
Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics
Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining
Regimes and the Rule of Law
Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency
The Appointments Dilemma
Locating Supreme Court Opinions in Doctrine Space
Courting the President
Supreme Court Appointments as a Move‐the‐Median Game
Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998
Delaying Justice(s)
Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection
The Marginality Hypothesis and Supreme Court Confirmation Votes in the Senate
The Politics of Presidential Speeches
Measuring the ideological preferences of U.S. presidents
Shaping America
The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers
The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process
Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices
Politics and personal factors in retirement from the United States Supreme Court
Strategic retirements
Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock
Lobbying for Justice
A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting
May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court
The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas
| Unique citing works | 118 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,37 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2025 (27) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 118 |