Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate
The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13828343 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony J Madonna (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 276-288 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-13 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00491.x |
| OpenAlex | W2123565796 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 38 |
Recent empirical work has brought a renewed attention to the effect congressional rules of procedure have on the size of winning coalitions. Specifically, scholars have posited that legislative success hinges on the support of legislators identified by institutionally defined decision rules. Under these theories, supermajority decision rules in the U.S. Senate lead to larger, more inclusive coalitions on final passage. In this article, I reevaluate these claims by controlling for changes in the legislative agenda and the roll-call voting record. I find that the aggregate size of winning coalitions is highly responsive to the underlying legislative agenda, the size of the Senate's majority party, and the manner in which researchers treat unrecorded votes. Further, my findings suggest that any connection between changes in the Senate's voting rules and the size of winning coalitions is spurious. Eric Schickler and Gregory J. Wawro have authored a response to this article, and Anthony J. Madonna has authored a rejoinder to this response. Both are available as Supporting Information
Law and economics · Legislature · Majority rule · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Spurious relationship · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
Lawmaking
Measuring legislative collaboration
The Purpose of Senatorial Grandstanding during Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings
Interbranch Warfare
Tariff politics and congressional elections
How we (should?) study Congress and history
Viva Voce
The Establishment of Party Policy Committees in the U.S. Senate
Conference Committee Proposal Rights and Policy Outcomes in the States
Coalition Formation in the House and Senate
Party Calls and Reelection in the US Senate
Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success
Veto-Proof Majorities, Legislative Procedures, and Presidential Decisions, 1981–2008
Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage
Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes
Pivotal Politics and the ideological content of Landmark Laws
Regulating the Floor
New Directions in Legislative Research
The tariff history of the United States
The theory of political coalitions.
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Filibustering
The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900
Veto Bargaining
Party Influence in Congress
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting
Divided we govern
Filibuster
Pivotal Politics
Pork Barrel Politics
Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
Laws and Roll Calls in the U.S. Congress, 1891–1994
The partisan paradox and the U.S. tariff, 1877–1934
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions
Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House
Going Nuclear, Senate Style
Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
The Statistical Analysis Of Roll‐Call Data
Taxation and the political economy of the tariff
Measuring Legislative Accomplishment, 1877–1994
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel
Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre‐cloture Senate
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Off the Record
Preferences, Parties, and Legislative Productivity
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
| Unique citing works | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,2 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2024 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |