Francis Lambrecht
Biographic Data
| ID | 584452 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Francis Lambrecht |
| GIVEN NAMES | Francis |
| FAMILY NAME | Lambrecht |
| SIGNATURE | LAMBRECHT F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9883-274X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1958 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Reparative justice, historical injustice, and the nonidentity problem
History is riddled with injustice. Nazi Germany murdered and stole from millions during the Holocaust. Imperial powers expropriated land, relocated populations, and violently maintain(ed) oppressive colonial systems. The slave trade created unimaginable suffering and oppression. These are examples of historical injustice. Historical injustices are unjust actions occurring in the past in which the original individual perpetrators and victims are n…
Epistemic Reparations and a Hybrid Theory of Reparative Justice
Philosophers have recently argued that epistemic injustices require epistemic reparations. I draw attention to a particular kind of epistemic injustice: Epistemic moral remainders. Epistemic moral remainders are epistemic harms victims of epistemic injustices experience even if the goods the epistemic injustice interfered with have been restored. Available theories of epistemic reparations have tended to focus on establishing how reparations can …
Reparations, Relational Equality, and Causation
In a recent article, Alexander Motchoulski offers a novel relational egalitarian view of reparations for historical injustice. Motchoulski argues that we ought to prefer the relational egalitarian view to available harm and inheritance theories because it avoids epistemic uncertainty. I argue that Motchoulski’s theory involves ambiguity that limits it in avoiding this epistemic uncertainty. I offer an amendment to Motchoulski’s theory that insula…
Reparative Justice for Historical Injustice
Reparative justice for historical injustice concerns what present agents and societies must do to remedy past wrongs. Examples of historical injustice include the Holocaust, colonial violence and land expropriations, and chattel slavery in the United States. There is widespread intuition that these kinds of past wrongs require some form of reparation. However, because of the time that has passed between past wrongs and the present, explaining why…
Self-induced moral incapacity, collective responsibility, and attributability
Niels De Haan (2023. “Collective Moral Agency and Self-Induced Moral Incapacity.” Philosophical Explorations 26 (1): 1–22) defends the possibility of holding collectives morally responsible against a challenge posed by the problem of self-induced moral incapacity. Self-induced moral incapacity seems to introduce a responsibility gap that corporate agents might exploit to avoid responsibility. De Haan argues that the problem does not introduce res…
The Epistemic Value of Travel: From Noise to Signal
There is a debate between Proponents and Skeptics about the epistemic value of travel. Proponents argue that there are normative reasons that speak in favour of travel based on the kinds of knowledge, beliefs, or other epistemically relevant features that we might acquire through travelling recreationally. Skeptics deny that travel provides distinctive epistemic value such as to give us normative reasons that speak in favour of it. In this paper …
Supersession-Proof Reparations: Harms, Wrongs, and Historical Injustice
There is widespread intuition that historical injustices require some form of redress. Despite this intuition, redress for historical injustice encounters significant philosophical problems. In this article, I defend the possibility of redress from one particular philosophical problem: the supersession thesis. According to the supersession thesis, circumstances may have changed between the historical injustice and the present such that present de…
Pluralism, Structural Injustice, and Reparations for Historical Injustice: A Reply to Daniel Butt
On the necessity of a pluralist theory of reparations for historical injustice
Philosophers have offered many arguments to explain why historical injustices require reparations. This paper raises an unnoticed challenge for almost all of them. Most theories of reparations attempt to meet two intuitions: (1) reparations are owed for a past wrong and (2) the content of reparations must reflect the historical injustice. I argue that necessarily no monistic theory can meet both intuitions. I do this by showing that any theory th…
Towards a theory of reparative multiculturalism
Contemporary liberal states must provide an answer to the “question of cultural diversity”, requiring a principled way to determine which minority cultural practices a state must accommodate and support. (Liberal egalitarian) multiculturalism answers this question neatly by creating a dichotomy between national minorities and ethnic minorities (the national/ethnic “dichotomy” ). Where national minorities are entitled to extensive and far-reaching…
The Hudhud of Dinulawan and Bugan at Gonhadan
The Kalinga "Ullalim" and Ifugaw Orthography
The Hudhud of Dinulawan and Bugan at Gonhadan
Ifugaw Weaving
Ifugaw Weaving
The Hudhud of Dinulawan and Bugan at Gonhadan
The Kalinga "Ullalim" and Ifugaw Orthography
The Hudhud of Dinulawan and Bugan at Gonhadan
Towards a theory of reparative multiculturalism
Contemporary liberal states must provide an answer to the “question of cultural diversity”, requiring a principled way to determine which minority cultural practices a state must accommodate and support. (Liberal egalitarian) multiculturalism answers this question neatly by creating a dichotomy between national minorities and ethnic minorities (the national/ethnic “dichotomy” ). Where national minorities are entitled to extensive and far-reaching…
Pluralism, Structural Injustice, and Reparations for Historical Injustice: A Reply to Daniel Butt
On the necessity of a pluralist theory of reparations for historical injustice
Philosophers have offered many arguments to explain why historical injustices require reparations. This paper raises an unnoticed challenge for almost all of them. Most theories of reparations attempt to meet two intuitions: (1) reparations are owed for a past wrong and (2) the content of reparations must reflect the historical injustice. I argue that necessarily no monistic theory can meet both intuitions. I do this by showing that any theory th…
Reparative Justice for Historical Injustice
Reparative justice for historical injustice concerns what present agents and societies must do to remedy past wrongs. Examples of historical injustice include the Holocaust, colonial violence and land expropriations, and chattel slavery in the United States. There is widespread intuition that these kinds of past wrongs require some form of reparation. However, because of the time that has passed between past wrongs and the present, explaining why…
Self-induced moral incapacity, collective responsibility, and attributability
Niels De Haan (2023. “Collective Moral Agency and Self-Induced Moral Incapacity.” Philosophical Explorations 26 (1): 1–22) defends the possibility of holding collectives morally responsible against a challenge posed by the problem of self-induced moral incapacity. Self-induced moral incapacity seems to introduce a responsibility gap that corporate agents might exploit to avoid responsibility. De Haan argues that the problem does not introduce res…
The Epistemic Value of Travel: From Noise to Signal
There is a debate between Proponents and Skeptics about the epistemic value of travel. Proponents argue that there are normative reasons that speak in favour of travel based on the kinds of knowledge, beliefs, or other epistemically relevant features that we might acquire through travelling recreationally. Skeptics deny that travel provides distinctive epistemic value such as to give us normative reasons that speak in favour of it. In this paper …
Supersession-Proof Reparations: Harms, Wrongs, and Historical Injustice
There is widespread intuition that historical injustices require some form of redress. Despite this intuition, redress for historical injustice encounters significant philosophical problems. In this article, I defend the possibility of redress from one particular philosophical problem: the supersession thesis. According to the supersession thesis, circumstances may have changed between the historical injustice and the present such that present de…
Reparative justice, historical injustice, and the nonidentity problem
History is riddled with injustice. Nazi Germany murdered and stole from millions during the Holocaust. Imperial powers expropriated land, relocated populations, and violently maintain(ed) oppressive colonial systems. The slave trade created unimaginable suffering and oppression. These are examples of historical injustice. Historical injustices are unjust actions occurring in the past in which the original individual perpetrators and victims are n…
Epistemic Reparations and a Hybrid Theory of Reparative Justice
Philosophers have recently argued that epistemic injustices require epistemic reparations. I draw attention to a particular kind of epistemic injustice: Epistemic moral remainders. Epistemic moral remainders are epistemic harms victims of epistemic injustices experience even if the goods the epistemic injustice interfered with have been restored. Available theories of epistemic reparations have tended to focus on establishing how reparations can …
Reparations, Relational Equality, and Causation
In a recent article, Alexander Motchoulski offers a novel relational egalitarian view of reparations for historical injustice. Motchoulski argues that we ought to prefer the relational egalitarian view to available harm and inheritance theories because it avoids epistemic uncertainty. I argue that Motchoulski’s theory involves ambiguity that limits it in avoiding this epistemic uncertainty. I offer an amendment to Motchoulski’s theory that insula…
Political Philosophy and Ethics (7 works) · Injustice (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Economic Justice (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (3 works)