Douglas C Long
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911043 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Douglas C Long |
| GIVEN NAMES | Douglas C |
| FAMILY NAME | Long |
| SIGNATURE | LONG D C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1964 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Avowals and First-Person Privilege
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merel…
Avowals and First‐Person Privilege
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first‐person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merel…
Ethics of an Artificial Person
One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism
In Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism I argue that traditional global epistemological skepticism is incoherent because it mistakenly assumes that we can question our knowledge of without undermining our self-knowledge.' The rationale behind my argument is idea that, since we are substantial agents who exist and act world among other material beings, view that our knowledge of our own existence and nature is or can be exclusively subjective is…
The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism
An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the external is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. For all I know, my life could be only a coherent dream in which objects and other people do not really exist. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave us no resources for successfully justifying our in the existence of an objective world beyon…
The Metaphysics of Mind
Particulars and Their Qualities
Particulars and Their Qualities Get access Douglas C. Long Douglas C. Long University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 18, Issue 72, July 1968, Pages 193–206, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218557 Published: 01 July 1968
The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body
THE ARGUMENT from analogy for the existence of other minds has been repeatedly attacked on two general counts. Its defenders have long been criticized for attempting to justify the inference that other bodies are associated with minds by an appeal merely to one's own case, while more recently the intelligibility of the concept of mind which the formulation of such an inference requires has been seriously challenged. Nothing has been said, however…
Avowals and First‐Person Privilege
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first‐person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merel…
The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism
An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the external is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. For all I know, my life could be only a coherent dream in which objects and other people do not really exist. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave us no resources for successfully justifying our in the existence of an objective world beyon…
Avowals and First-Person Privilege
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merel…
The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body
THE ARGUMENT from analogy for the existence of other minds has been repeatedly attacked on two general counts. Its defenders have long been criticized for attempting to justify the inference that other bodies are associated with minds by an appeal merely to one's own case, while more recently the intelligibility of the concept of mind which the formulation of such an inference requires has been seriously challenged. Nothing has been said, however…
The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body
THE ARGUMENT from analogy for the existence of other minds has been repeatedly attacked on two general counts. Its defenders have long been criticized for attempting to justify the inference that other bodies are associated with minds by an appeal merely to one's own case, while more recently the intelligibility of the concept of mind which the formulation of such an inference requires has been seriously challenged. Nothing has been said, however…
Particulars and Their Qualities
Particulars and Their Qualities Get access Douglas C. Long Douglas C. Long University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 18, Issue 72, July 1968, Pages 193–206, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218557 Published: 01 July 1968
The Metaphysics of Mind
The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism
An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the external is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. For all I know, my life could be only a coherent dream in which objects and other people do not really exist. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave us no resources for successfully justifying our in the existence of an objective world beyon…
Ethics of an Artificial Person
One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism
In Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism I argue that traditional global epistemological skepticism is incoherent because it mistakenly assumes that we can question our knowledge of without undermining our self-knowledge.' The rationale behind my argument is idea that, since we are substantial agents who exist and act world among other material beings, view that our knowledge of our own existence and nature is or can be exclusively subjective is…
Avowals and First-Person Privilege
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merel…
Avowals and First‐Person Privilege
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first‐person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merel…
Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Contemporary philosophy (2 works) · Convention (2 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works)