Andreas Darmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 6037707 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andreas Darmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andreas |
| FAMILY NAME | Darmann |
| SIGNATURE | DARMANN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Graz |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0477-4578 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Rank information and inequality in social welfare functions
In this paper we use rank information to construct a measure of preference satisfaction by collective decision rules and to compare the Borda rule with the plurality rule with respect to the inequality their outcome induces. While the construction of our measure of preference satisfaction is formally equivalent to Borda utilities, it turns out that, with respect to equality, the Borda rule is not necessarily superior to plurality rule for the cas…
Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019
Based on data collected in connection with the 2019 parliamentary election in the Austrian region of Styria, we analyze (the use of) different voting rules. Following previous empirical studies in the literature, we use the results of an empirical survey to show that the choice of a voting rule will impact the outcome of an election (if revealed preferences are sincere), at least in certain parts of the social ranking. In addition, we observe a c…
A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection
Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences
We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally,…
How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee
This paper establishes the computational complexity status for a problem of deciding on the quality of a committee. Starting with individual preferences over alternatives, we analyse when it can be determined efficiently if a given committee [Formula: see text] satisfies a weak (resp. strong) Condorcet criterion-i.e., if [Formula: see text] is at least as good as (resp. better than) every other committee in a pairwise majority comparison. Scoring…
A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences
We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally,…
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019
Based on data collected in connection with the 2019 parliamentary election in the Austrian region of Styria, we analyze (the use of) different voting rules. Following previous empirical studies in the literature, we use the results of an empirical survey to show that the choice of a voting rule will impact the outcome of an election (if revealed preferences are sincere), at least in certain parts of the social ranking. In addition, we observe a c…
How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee
This paper establishes the computational complexity status for a problem of deciding on the quality of a committee. Starting with individual preferences over alternatives, we analyse when it can be determined efficiently if a given committee [Formula: see text] satisfies a weak (resp. strong) Condorcet criterion-i.e., if [Formula: see text] is at least as good as (resp. better than) every other committee in a pairwise majority comparison. Scoring…
A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee
This paper establishes the computational complexity status for a problem of deciding on the quality of a committee. Starting with individual preferences over alternatives, we analyse when it can be determined efficiently if a given committee [Formula: see text] satisfies a weak (resp. strong) Condorcet criterion-i.e., if [Formula: see text] is at least as good as (resp. better than) every other committee in a pairwise majority comparison. Scoring…
Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences
We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally,…
A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection
Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019
Based on data collected in connection with the 2019 parliamentary election in the Austrian region of Styria, we analyze (the use of) different voting rules. Following previous empirical studies in the literature, we use the results of an empirical survey to show that the choice of a voting rule will impact the outcome of an election (if revealed preferences are sincere), at least in certain parts of the social ranking. In addition, we observe a c…
Rank information and inequality in social welfare functions
In this paper we use rank information to construct a measure of preference satisfaction by collective decision rules and to compare the Borda rule with the plurality rule with respect to the inequality their outcome induces. While the construction of our measure of preference satisfaction is formally equivalent to Borda utilities, it turns out that, with respect to equality, the Borda rule is not necessarily superior to plurality rule for the cas…
Game Theory and Voting Systems (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Voting (5 works) · Combinatorics (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Social choice theory (4 works) · Approval voting (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works)