Christopher A Bobier
Biographic Data
| ID | 9030406 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christopher A Bobier |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christopher A |
| FAMILY NAME | Bobier |
| SIGNATURE | BOBIER C A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Central Michigan University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Bodyoids and Moral Status
Bodyoids are human organisms engineered to lack consciousness and have been proposed as a potential solution to the shortage of bodies available for use as organ donors, cadavers in medical education, and as human research participants.In our bodyoids article (Rodger et al., 2025), we argued that creating bodyoids is ethically dubious.First, we explain that some accounts of moral status entail that bodyoids will possess full moral status, which i…
Bodyoids and Speculative Bioethics
Alexandre Erler’s commentary challenges our argument against creating human ‘bodyoids’. While he considers our concerns speculative, we briefly defend speculative bioethics as vital for anticipating ethical risks before technologies emerge. We maintain that historical practices such as organ procurement and embryo experimentation illustrate how instrumental uses of human bodies can erode moral boundaries. Erler’s confidence in safeguards like the…
Genetic disenhancement and xenotransplantation
One objection to xenotransplantation is that it will require the large-scale breeding, raising and killing of genetically modified pigs. The pigs will need to be raised in designated pathogen-free facilities and undergo a range of medical tests before having their organs removed and being euthanised. As a result, they will have significantly shortened life expectancies, will experience pain and suffering and be subject to a degree of social and e…
Defending genetic disenhancement in xenotransplantation
Why appeals to the moral significance of birth are saddled with a dilemma
In ‘Dilemma for Appeals to the Moral Significance of Birth’, we argued that a dilemma is faced by those who believe that birth is the event at which infanticide is ruled out. Those who reject the moral permissibility of infanticide by appeal to the moral significance of birth must either accept the moral permissibility of a late-term abortion for a non-therapeutic reason or not. If they accept it, they need to account for the strong intuition tha…
Dilemma for appeals to the moral significance of birth
Giubilini and Minerva argue that the permissibility of abortion entails the permissibility of infanticide. Proponents of what we refer to as the Birth Strategy claim that there is a morally significant difference brought about at birth that accounts for our strong intuition that killing newborns is morally impermissible. We argue that strategy does not account for the moral intuition that late-term, non-therapeutic abortions are morally impermiss…
Orphans and the relational significance of birth
Prabhpal Singh has defended a relational account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. Newborns stand in the parent-child relation while fetuses do not, and standing in the parent-child relationship brings with it higher moral status for newborns. Orphans pose a problem for this account because they do not stand in a parent-child relationship. I argue that Singh has not satisfactorily responded to the problem
No prominent works on this page.
Dilemma for appeals to the moral significance of birth
Giubilini and Minerva argue that the permissibility of abortion entails the permissibility of infanticide. Proponents of what we refer to as the Birth Strategy claim that there is a morally significant difference brought about at birth that accounts for our strong intuition that killing newborns is morally impermissible. We argue that strategy does not account for the moral intuition that late-term, non-therapeutic abortions are morally impermiss…
Orphans and the relational significance of birth
Prabhpal Singh has defended a relational account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. Newborns stand in the parent-child relation while fetuses do not, and standing in the parent-child relationship brings with it higher moral status for newborns. Orphans pose a problem for this account because they do not stand in a parent-child relationship. I argue that Singh has not satisfactorily responded to the problem
Why appeals to the moral significance of birth are saddled with a dilemma
In ‘Dilemma for Appeals to the Moral Significance of Birth’, we argued that a dilemma is faced by those who believe that birth is the event at which infanticide is ruled out. Those who reject the moral permissibility of infanticide by appeal to the moral significance of birth must either accept the moral permissibility of a late-term abortion for a non-therapeutic reason or not. If they accept it, they need to account for the strong intuition tha…
Genetic disenhancement and xenotransplantation
One objection to xenotransplantation is that it will require the large-scale breeding, raising and killing of genetically modified pigs. The pigs will need to be raised in designated pathogen-free facilities and undergo a range of medical tests before having their organs removed and being euthanised. As a result, they will have significantly shortened life expectancies, will experience pain and suffering and be subject to a degree of social and e…
Defending genetic disenhancement in xenotransplantation
Bodyoids and Moral Status
Bodyoids are human organisms engineered to lack consciousness and have been proposed as a potential solution to the shortage of bodies available for use as organ donors, cadavers in medical education, and as human research participants.In our bodyoids article (Rodger et al., 2025), we argued that creating bodyoids is ethically dubious.First, we explain that some accounts of moral status entail that bodyoids will possess full moral status, which i…
Bodyoids and Speculative Bioethics
Alexandre Erler’s commentary challenges our argument against creating human ‘bodyoids’. While he considers our concerns speculative, we briefly defend speculative bioethics as vital for anticipating ethical risks before technologies emerge. We maintain that historical practices such as organ procurement and embryo experimentation illustrate how instrumental uses of human bodies can erode moral boundaries. Erler’s confidence in safeguards like the…
Psychology (4 works) · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare (3 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Abortion (2 works) · Bioethics (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works)