Howard J Curzer
Biographic Data
| ID | 976086 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Howard J Curzer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Howard J |
| FAMILY NAME | Curzer |
| SIGNATURE | CURZER H J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Texas Tech University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5006-8992 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 28 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 39 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Self-Deception and Dissociation
Akratic and beneficial intentional self-deception
The folk explanation of self-deception is that one mental subsystem deceives another. Deflationists appeal to motivated irrationality rather than deceptive subsystems to offer nifty accounts of many sorts of self-deception. However, I shall show that deflationists cannot explain the self-deception embedded within (1) impulsive, (2) vacillating, or (3) long-term akrasia. These akratic actions are respectively too short, too variable, or too long f…
The Virtuous Data Scientist and the Ethics of Good Science
Virtue, Narrative, and Self: Explorations of Character in the Philosophy of Mind and Action
"Virtue, Narrative, and Self: Explorations of Character in the Philosophy of Mind and Action." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(4), p. 841
Introducing the Virtue of Good Timing and Some Surprising Functions of Practical Reason
Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation, written by Matthew Walker
Aristotelian Demons
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Yesterday’s Virtue Ethicists Meet Tomorrow’s High Tech: A Critical Response to Technology and the Virtues by Shannon Vallor
Against Idealization in Virtue Ethics
Many virtue ethicists implicitly or explicitly make use of an ideal—the concept of a perfect character, a character that is at best approximated, but never realized. I shall argue against the use of ideals (idealization) in virtue ethics on both theoretical and practical grounds. The widespread, implicit assumption that ideals are necessary bits of theoretical machinery is not only false, but counterproductive. The widespread use of ideals as goa…
Aristotelian Character Education
Aristotle's Practical Syllogisms
Virtues and Their Vices
Despite its high price, Virtues and Their Vices is a bargain because it is (figuratively) two books in one. The two volumes differ in content, tone, and degree of coherence. Along with a common binding, the two volumes share a clearly written, helpful introduction, and a thorough index. Each essay has its own bibliography. Volume I consists of essays on the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance), the three theological vi…
Like Doctor Who, Aristotle Needs a Companion
Plato’s Rejection of the Instrumental Account of Friendship in the Lysis
In the Lysis, Socrates argues that friendship is driven by a desire to use others for one’s own gain (210b-d). Some commentators take Socrates to be speaking for Plato on this point. By contrast, I shall argue that the Lysis is a reductio ad absurdum of this instrumental account of friendship. First, three arguments in the Lysis (210c-d, 214b-215b, 216d-218a) reach counterintuitive conclusions which may be avoided by abandoning the common premise…
Environmental Research Ethics
General, Particular, and Poetic Justice (NE V)
Aristotle devotes one tenth of his Nicomachean Ethics to the virtue of justice. Yet although interest in Aristotle’s ethics, virtue ethics, and justice is on the rise, Aristotle’s account of the virtue of justice has been somewhat neglected. Perhaps this is because Aristotle’s account of justice is reputed to be contradictory, implausible, and even unAristotelian (in the sense that it does not fit Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean). This chapter r…
Courage and Continence (NE III.6–9)
Aristotle is famous for his doctrine of the mean, but this is just one of several doctrines that together constitute Aristotle’s architectonic of virtue. The others include the doctrine of disjoint spheres which says that no situation is governed by more than one virtue, and the parameter doctrine which says each virtue is a disposition for getting all of the relevant parameters right (e.g. fearing the right objects, on the right occasions, to th…
Megalopsychia and Appropriate Ambition (NE IV.3–4)
Some interpreters take megalopsychia to be fundamentally concerned with honor, but this chapter argues that greatness and self-knowledge are the core components of megalopsychia. This eliminates some interpretive problems, but others remain. Not only is Aristotle’s treatment of megalopsychia internally inconsistent, it also clashes with certain other parts of Aristotle’s ethics. These problems arise because Aristotle defines megalopsychia as a co…
Justice in Friendship (NE VIII–IX)
Aristotle and the Virtues
Howard J. Curzer presents a fresh new reading of Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics', which brings each of the virtues alive. He argues that justice and friendship are symbiotic in Aristotle's view; reveals how virtue ethics is not only about being good but about becoming good; and describes Aristotle's quest to determine happiness
Aristotle: Founder of the Ethics of Care
From Duty, Moral Worth, Good Will
Je propose, dans cet article, une analyse détaillée des paragraphes 397 à 401 des Fondements, réfutant certaines objections traditionnelles à la position de Kant et en soulevant de nouvelles. Je proposerai et défendrai, cefaisant, une interprétation de ce que Kant veut dire par les expressions «par devoir», «valeur morale» et «bonne volonté»
Withdrawal of life-support: Four problems in medical ethics
Fry's Concept Of Care In Nursing Ethics
Sara T. Fry maintains that care is a central concept for nursing ethics. This requires, among other things, that care is a virtue rather than a mode of being. But if care is a central virtue of ethics and medical ethics then the claim that care is a central concept for nursing ethics is trivial. Otherwise, it is implausible
The Supremely Happy Life in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle and the Virtues
Howard J. Curzer presents a fresh new reading of Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics', which brings each of the virtues alive. He argues that justice and friendship are symbiotic in Aristotle's view; reveals how virtue ethics is not only about being good but about becoming good; and describes Aristotle's quest to determine happiness
Criteria for Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics I 7 and X 6–8
In I 7 Aristotle lays down criteria for what is to count as human happiness. Happiness for man is self-sufficient ( autarkes ), complete without qualification ( teleion haplos ), peculiar to humans ( idion ), excellent ( kat' aretēn ), and best and most complete ( aristēn kai teleiotatēn ). Many interpreters agree that in X 6–8 Aristotle uses these along with other criteria to disqualify the life of amusement and rank one happy life above another
Fry's Concept Of Care In Nursing Ethics
Sara T. Fry maintains that care is a central concept for nursing ethics. This requires, among other things, that care is a virtue rather than a mode of being. But if care is a central virtue of ethics and medical ethics then the claim that care is a central concept for nursing ethics is trivial. Otherwise, it is implausible
A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotle's Treatment of Greatness of Soul'
Once again it is becoming fashionable to ask ‘What character traits are virtues?’ Naturally, it behooves us to try to recapture the insights of our predecessors, as well as forging ahead on our own. In this paper I shall examine one such insight.
Criteria for Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics I 7 and X 6–8
In I 7 Aristotle lays down criteria for what is to count as human happiness. Happiness for man is self-sufficient ( autarkes ), complete without qualification ( teleion haplos ), peculiar to humans ( idion ), excellent ( kat' aretēn ), and best and most complete ( aristēn kai teleiotatēn ). Many interpreters agree that in X 6–8 Aristotle uses these along with other criteria to disqualify the life of amusement and rank one happy life above another
The Supremely Happy Life in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Two Varieties of Temperance in the Gorgias
Fry's Concept Of Care In Nursing Ethics
Sara T. Fry maintains that care is a central concept for nursing ethics. This requires, among other things, that care is a virtue rather than a mode of being. But if care is a central virtue of ethics and medical ethics then the claim that care is a central concept for nursing ethics is trivial. Otherwise, it is implausible
Withdrawal of life-support: Four problems in medical ethics
From Duty, Moral Worth, Good Will
Je propose, dans cet article, une analyse détaillée des paragraphes 397 à 401 des Fondements, réfutant certaines objections traditionnelles à la position de Kant et en soulevant de nouvelles. Je proposerai et défendrai, cefaisant, une interprétation de ce que Kant veut dire par les expressions «par devoir», «valeur morale» et «bonne volonté»
Aristotle: Founder of the Ethics of Care
General, Particular, and Poetic Justice (NE V)
Aristotle devotes one tenth of his Nicomachean Ethics to the virtue of justice. Yet although interest in Aristotle’s ethics, virtue ethics, and justice is on the rise, Aristotle’s account of the virtue of justice has been somewhat neglected. Perhaps this is because Aristotle’s account of justice is reputed to be contradictory, implausible, and even unAristotelian (in the sense that it does not fit Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean). This chapter r…
Courage and Continence (NE III.6–9)
Aristotle is famous for his doctrine of the mean, but this is just one of several doctrines that together constitute Aristotle’s architectonic of virtue. The others include the doctrine of disjoint spheres which says that no situation is governed by more than one virtue, and the parameter doctrine which says each virtue is a disposition for getting all of the relevant parameters right (e.g. fearing the right objects, on the right occasions, to th…
Megalopsychia and Appropriate Ambition (NE IV.3–4)
Some interpreters take megalopsychia to be fundamentally concerned with honor, but this chapter argues that greatness and self-knowledge are the core components of megalopsychia. This eliminates some interpretive problems, but others remain. Not only is Aristotle’s treatment of megalopsychia internally inconsistent, it also clashes with certain other parts of Aristotle’s ethics. These problems arise because Aristotle defines megalopsychia as a co…
Justice in Friendship (NE VIII–IX)
Aristotle and the Virtues
Howard J. Curzer presents a fresh new reading of Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics', which brings each of the virtues alive. He argues that justice and friendship are symbiotic in Aristotle's view; reveals how virtue ethics is not only about being good but about becoming good; and describes Aristotle's quest to determine happiness
Environmental Research Ethics
Plato’s Rejection of the Instrumental Account of Friendship in the Lysis
In the Lysis, Socrates argues that friendship is driven by a desire to use others for one’s own gain (210b-d). Some commentators take Socrates to be speaking for Plato on this point. By contrast, I shall argue that the Lysis is a reductio ad absurdum of this instrumental account of friendship. First, three arguments in the Lysis (210c-d, 214b-215b, 216d-218a) reach counterintuitive conclusions which may be avoided by abandoning the common premise…
Aristotle's Practical Syllogisms
Virtues and Their Vices
Despite its high price, Virtues and Their Vices is a bargain because it is (figuratively) two books in one. The two volumes differ in content, tone, and degree of coherence. Along with a common binding, the two volumes share a clearly written, helpful introduction, and a thorough index. Each essay has its own bibliography. Volume I consists of essays on the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance), the three theological vi…
Like Doctor Who, Aristotle Needs a Companion
Aristotelian Character Education
Against Idealization in Virtue Ethics
Many virtue ethicists implicitly or explicitly make use of an ideal—the concept of a perfect character, a character that is at best approximated, but never realized. I shall argue against the use of ideals (idealization) in virtue ethics on both theoretical and practical grounds. The widespread, implicit assumption that ideals are necessary bits of theoretical machinery is not only false, but counterproductive. The widespread use of ideals as goa…
Aristotelian Demons
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Yesterday’s Virtue Ethicists Meet Tomorrow’s High Tech: A Critical Response to Technology and the Virtues by Shannon Vallor
Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation, written by Matthew Walker
Virtue, Narrative, and Self: Explorations of Character in the Philosophy of Mind and Action
"Virtue, Narrative, and Self: Explorations of Character in the Philosophy of Mind and Action." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(4), p. 841
Introducing the Virtue of Good Timing and Some Surprising Functions of Practical Reason
Philosophy (22 works) · Epistemology (17 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (9 works) · Social Psychology (9 works) · Virtue (9 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Environmental ethics (6 works)