Selection in Insurance Markets

Theory and Empirics in Pictures

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4841836
AutoresLiran Einav (0000-0003-3349-5356, Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California and Research Associates, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.), Amy Finkelstein (0000-0002-9941-6684, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts and Research Associates, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.)
Ano2011
Volume25
Fascículo1
Páginas115-138
Data de publicação2011-02-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965
EditoraAmerican Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1257/jep.25.1.115
PMID21595322
OpenAlexW2102738074
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas19
Referências citadas17

Government intervention in insurance markets is ubiquitous and the theoretical basis for such intervention, based on classic work from the 1970s, has been the problem of adverse selection. Over the last decade, empirical work on selection in insurance markets has gained considerable momentum. This research finds that adverse selection exists in some insurance markets but not in others. And it has uncovered examples of markets that exhibit "advantageous selection"-a phenomenon not considered by the original theory, and one that has different consequences for equilibrium insurance allocation and optimal public policy than the classical case of adverse selection. Advantageous selection arises when the individuals who are willing to pay the most for insurance are those who are the most risk averse (and so have the lowest expected cost). Indeed, it is natural to think that in many instances individuals who value insurance more may also take action to lower their expected costs: drive more carefully, invest in preventive health care, and so on. Researchers have taken steps toward estimating the welfare consequences of detected selection and of potential public policy interventions. In this essay, we present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work on selection in insurance markets. This graphical approach provides both a useful and intuitive depiction of the basic theory of selection and its implications for welfare and public policy, as well as a lens through which one can understand the ideas and limitations of existing empirical work on this topic

Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Auto insurance risk selection · Economic interventionism · Economics · Empirical research · General insurance · Group insurance · Income protection insurance · Insurance policy · Key person insurance · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Welfare · Computer Science · Global Health Care Issues · Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life · Healthcare Policy and Management