Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9706946
AutoresAmy Finkelstein (0000-0002-9941-6684, MIT), James Poterba (MIT and NBER), James M Poterba (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Ano2002
Volume112
Fascículo476
Páginas28-50
Data de publicação2002-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.0j672
OpenAlexW2001895530
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas12

This paper explores adverse selection in the voluntary and compulsory individual annuity markets in the United Kingdom. Two empirical regularities support standard models of adverse selection. First, annuitants are longer-lived than non-annuitants. These mortality differences are more pronounced in the voluntary than in the compulsory annuity market. We estimate that the amount of adverse selection in the compulsory market is about one half of that in the voluntary market. Second, the pricing of different types of annuity products within each annuity market is consistent with individuals selecting products based, in part, on private information about their mortality prospects. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002

Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Annuity · Business · Economics · Life annuity · Selection (genetic algorithm · Turnover · Finance · Global Health Care Issues · Healthcare Policy and Management · Insurance, Mortality, Demography, Risk Management