Decision Making on the World Court
Are International Judges Geopolitically Biased
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071593 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Arthur Dyevre (0000-0002-8702-6179, KU Leuven, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1661-1686 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027251326576 |
| OpenAlex | W4408481097 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 48 |
Do international adjudicators align with the foreign policy interests of their home country? This article contributes new evidence that judges on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) diverge along similar lines as their home states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Ideal points for judges and countries are estimated from nonunanimous judicial votes up to January 2023 using Item Response Modelling and then related to country ideal points estimated from UNGA votes in earlier research. The analysis reveals that, as with countries in the UNGA, a pro-anti-Western divide order constitutes the main dimension of disagreement on the Court. Moreover, ideal points derived from UNGA voting patterns are themselves robust predictors of voting affinity among judges as well as between judges and the parties involved in litigation. Judges originating from nations exhibiting greater geopolitical divergence are more likely to disagree. Just as judges from more pro-Western states are less likely to favour anti-Western litigant states
Economics · Law and economics · Political science · International Arbitration and Investment Law · International Law and Human Rights · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Politics of Identifying Customary International Law
Voting Behaviour and National Bias in the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice
The Job Market for Justice
Selecting candidates to the bench of the World Court
Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review
(Non)renewable Terms and Judicial Independence in the European Court of Human Rights
Democratic Compromise
Backlash and Judicial Restraint
The Politics of International Judicial Appointments
Judicial ideology in economic cases
The Impartiality of International Judges
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999
How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court
The International Court of Justice and the World's Three Legal Systems
Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes
Bloc Voting on the International Court of Justice
Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data
Democracy and Multilateralism
Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty
Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics
The Court of Justice and treaty revision
Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics
Dissent in Iberia
Legal Realism for Economists
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |