Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review
Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11623962 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeffrey A Segal (Stony Brook University), Chad Westerland (0009-0002-3458-3884, University of Arizona), Stefanie A Lindquist |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-104 |
| Publication date | 2010-10-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00480.x |
| OpenAlex | W3126039551 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 70 |
| References cited | 38 |
Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational-anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional-maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll-call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress
Certiorari · Constitution · Constitutional court · Legislation · Majority opinion · Original jurisdiction · Political science · Supreme court · Supreme Court Decisions · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies
O Supremo Tribunal Federal
Curbing the Court
National Policy Preferences and Judicial Review of State Statutes at the United States Supreme Court
Measuring Judicial Appeasement of the United States Supreme Court
No Shelter in Unanimity
Judicial Deference and Executive Control Over Administrative Agencies
How Courts Structure State-Level Representation
Judicial Review as a Limit on Government Domination
The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy
The Swing Justice
Judicial Majoritarianism
Presidential Constraints on Supreme Court Decision-Making
Pivotal Politics as Normal Science
Decision Making on the World Court
Understanding Judicial Power
Case Salience and the Influence of External Constraints on the Supreme Court
Political Competition and Judicial Independence
On Separation of Powers and Obfuscation in US Supreme Court Opinions
Judicial Ideology in the Absence of Rights
How the Supreme Court Alters Opinion Language to Evade Congressional Review
The Conditioning Role of Judicial Independence in the Exercise of Judicial Review
Reevaluating the Implications of Decision-Making Models
Beyond Liberal and Conservative
A Separation-of-Powers Approach to the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Caseload
The Maintenance of Institutional Legitimacy in Supreme Court Justices’ Public Rhetoric
Stepping on Congress
Judicial Federalism and Representation
Lacking Legislative Experience
Judicial Guardians
Lower Courts in Interbranch Conflict
Blurring Institutional Boundaries
Preserving Institutional Power
The Impact of Divided Government on the Supreme Court Appointment Process
A Case for Supreme Court Term Limits? The Changing Ideological Relationship between Appointing Presidents and Supreme Court Justices
The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions
The Supreme Court and Congress
Mixed Signals? Rethinking How Ideology and Institutional Motivations Shape the Solicitor General’s Positions
Severability Doctrine and the Exercise of Judicial Review
Judicial Institutions, Independence, and the Separation of Powers
The Law
Ideologists, Non-Ideologists and the Construct Validity of One-Dimensional Measures of Political Ideology
How institutions structure judicial behaviour
Ideology and Risk Focus
Double-Bind on the Bench
Greater public confidence in the US Supreme Court predicts more jurisdiction stripping
Legislative Coalitions and Judicial Turnover under Political Uncertainty
Ideology and Specific Support for the Supreme Court
The Conditional Effectiveness of Legislative Threats
Executive Power and Judicial Deference
Correcting the Record
Restraining the Court
Deciding Not to Decide
An Analysis of Policy-Based Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions
Political and constitutional overrides
Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty
The Court of Justice and treaty revision
Pushing Boundaries
Institutional Bargaining for Democratic Theorists (or How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Haggling)
Reconsidering Judicial Preferences
The Semiconstrained Court
Understanding the Role of the European Court of Justice in European Integration
US Supreme Court Institutional Integrity in Case Selection
Ideological Polarization on the Supreme Court
Policy, Politics, and Public Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court
Supreme Court Oral Arguments and Institutional Maintenance
Testing Judicial Power
Judicial self fashioning
Judges as Party Animals
The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions
A Social Movement Model for Judicial Behavior
Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting
Setting the Agenda
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
Congressional Control or Judicial Independence
The Judicial Common Space
Pivotal Politics
Judicial Review by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
Between Law and Politics
The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights
Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review
Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the Constitution
Court Curbing, Court Reversals, and Judicial Review
Interpose Your Friendly Hand”
Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research
Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court through Multidimensional Scaling
Congress Confronts the Court
The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999
Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power
Gatekeeping
Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers
Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making
Pulling Punches
Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship
Inviting Congressional Action
The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy
Signals from the Tenth Justice
On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts
How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas
| Unique citing works | 70 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,12 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 69 |