Conflict and Survival in Triads
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071741 |
|---|---|
| Authors | E Alan Hartman (Department of Psychology University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), James L Phillips (Computer Institute for Social Science Research Michigan State University), Steven G Cole (Department of Psychology Texas Christian University) |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 589-608 |
| Publication date | 1976-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277602000402 |
| OpenAlex | W1908109048 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 17 |
A study of conflictive behavior in a three-person laboratory game provided support for five hypotheses or principles of survival in multipolar power systems: (1) the probability of survival is maximized by having as much or more power than the combination of all potential enemies; (2) if such hegemony is not possible, the probability of survival increases and conflict decreases following a transition from a multipolar to a bipolar power system; (3) disparity of power tends to increase conflict and reduce survival probabilities; (4) if power hegemony does not exist, survival is inversely related to power; and (5) aggressive (as opposed to pacific) behavior is positively related to survival. In addition, the conflict process was found to be a function of both structural and motivational factors
Biology · Evolutionary biology · Function (biology · Hegemony · Physics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Statistics · Survival analysis · Survival function · Survival of the fittest · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Statistical principles in experimental design.
A bargaining theory of coalition formation.
Coalitions in the Triad
The two disciplines of scientific psychology
The effects of divisibility of payoff on confederative behavior
Examination of the power-inversion effect in three-person mixed-motive games
Equity and the formation of revolutionary and conservative coalitions in triads
Sex differences in factors contributing to the level of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Conflict and cooperation in potentially intense conflict situations
Cooperative choice in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
Beyond the two disciplines of scientific psychology
Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability
An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad
A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
Further Development of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,04 |
| Citation span | 1980 - 1981 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |