Does Local Representation Reduce Self-Determination Conflict

Bibliographic Data

ID10071746
AuthorsAlejandro Corvalan (0000-0001-9281-8018, Industrial Engineering, Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume69
Issue7-8
Pages1433-1460
Publication date2024-11-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027241299815
OpenAlexW4404549541
LanguageEN
References cited51

There is ample evidence that the political exclusion of minorities from state power increases the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, do these same results apply to local representation? I explore this question using the success in mayoral elections of the Chilean Mapuche, a deprived indigenous minority in a longstanding conflict against the Chilean state. Combining a novel database on conflict and a surname strategy to single out Mapuche mayors, panel evidence suggests a negative association between minority mayors and local self-determination conflict. To provide identification, I exploit an electoral reform that exogenously changes the candidates’ probability of being elected. Land invasions, a primary type of conflict strategy for ethnic minorities, significantly decreased after the election of Mapuche mayors. I discuss the role of local horizontal inequalities and coercion as possible mechanisms

Coercion (linguistics · Criminology · Ethnic group · Identification (biology · Indigenous · Inequality · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Representation (politics · Sociology · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Systems and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America

Tools

Open DOI