Can We Infer Naturalism from Scepticism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692038
AutoresWard E Jones (0000-0001-6062-6388, Rhodes University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2000
Volumen50
Número201
Páginas433-451
Fecha de publicación2000-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00198
OpenAlexW2150522064
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas5

Hume, like a number of more recent writers, claims that epistemological scepticism gives us reason to think that our beliefs are non‐epistemically determined. Because some body of propositions that we believe are all unjustifiable, the argument goes, our beliefs in those propositions must be determined by non‐truth‐conducive considerations. I argue initially that scepticism does not by itself entail Humean naturalism. I then then develop an argument from scepticism to naturalism which has considerable promise. This more complex argument is built around two considerations: (i) if a subject accepts a local sceptical argument against one of his beliefs and still does not give it up, then we have very good, if not conclusive, reason to think that his belief is non‐epistemically determined; (ii) it seems initially plausible that global scepticism can have no affect on the beliefs it targets, even if we were to accept it. Unfortunately, however, even this argument ultimately fails to establish any connection between scepticism and Humean naturalism

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Naturalism · Skepticism · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science