Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10693176 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Sinan Dogramaci (The University of Texas at Austin), Miriam Schoenfield (The University of Texas at Austin) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Volumen | 134 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 1-33 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editorial | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-11591068 |
| OpenAlex | W4407303356 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 22 |
This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications
Physics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
The Unity of Perception
Problems for Dogmatism
The Boltzmann Brains Puzzle
Center indifference and skepticism
Elusive knowledge
Dragging and Confirming
The Simulation Argument
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self‐Locating Belief
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
Main Trends in Recent Philosophy
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |