Applying the Causal Theory of Reference to Intentional Concepts

Bibliographic Data

ID10705190
AuthorsJohn Michael (0000-0003-4516-196X, University of Warwick), Miles MacLeod (0000-0002-6346-545X, Georgia Institute of Technology)
Year2013
Volume80
Issue2
Pages212-230
Publication date2013-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/670328
OpenAlexW2122337042
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited60

We argue that many recent philosophical discussions about the reference of everyday concepts of intentional states have implicitly been predicated on descriptive theories of reference. To rectify this, we attempt to demonstrate how a causal theory can be applied to intentional concepts. Specifically, we argue that some phenomena in early social development (e.g., mimicry, gaze following, and emotional contagion) can serve as reference fixers that enable children to track others’ intentional states and, thus, to refer to those states. This allows intentional concepts to be anchored to their referents, even if folk psychological descriptions turn out to be false

Causal theory of reference · Epistemology · Action Observation and Synchronization · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Philosophy

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