Group lending and individual lending with strategic default
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11889686 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bharat Bhole (Rochester Institute of Technology, corresponding author), Sean P Ogden (Rochester Institute of Technology), Sean Ogden |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 348-363 |
| Publication date | 2009-06-19 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Development Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-3878 • E-ISSN: 1872-6089 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.06.004 |
| OpenAlex | W2005063514 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 11 |
Business · Collusion · Default · Economics · Financial system · Group (periodic table · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Sanctions · Social Welfare · Welfare · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Islamic Finance and Banking Studies · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Finance
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| Citations per year | 1.08 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2023 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |