Thinking the other, thinking otherwise

Levinas’ conception of responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID11937381
AuthorsElse Buddeberg (0000-0003-4057-5274, Goethe University Frankfurt, corresponding author), Eva Buddeberg (Department of Social Sciences, Goethe-University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany)
Year2018
Volume43
Issue2
Pages146-155
Publication date2018-04-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInterdisciplinary Science Reviews (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0308-0188 • E-ISSN: 1743-2790
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03080188.2018.1450927
OpenAlexW2800449559
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited10

Probably no other philosopher described the encounter with the other (human being) in a more radical way than Emmanuel Levinas. This led him to a new interpretation of responsibility as origin of all our ethical obligations towards others. He put into question a philosophical tradition of thought he accused of taking the ego as sole origin of all foundation of meaning. In this paper, I begin by outlining Levinas’ criticism of the occidental tradition of thought to explain the place of the other in his writings. I go on to explicate Levinas’ peculiar understanding of ‘responsibility for the other’. I will show how important it is in Levinas’ work not to isolate the question of responsibility from the question of justice. Finally, I examine what other capabilities would be required in order to act in a responsible and just way

Criticism · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence · Id, ego and super-ego · Interpretation (philosophy · Meaning (existential · Order (exchange · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Sociology · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology

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