Cultivating Sentimental Dispositions Through Aristotelian Habituation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11951599 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jan Steutel (corresponding author), Ben Spiecker |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 531-549 |
| Publication date | 2004-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Philosophy of Education (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0309-8249 • E-ISSN: 1467-9752 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0309-8249.2004.00403.x |
| OpenAlex | W1965097556 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 11 |
The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the 'hard core' of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view
Action (physics · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Habituation · Judgement · Psychotherapist · Virtue · Education and Critical Thinking Development · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
Positive Youth Development
Moral‐Character Education
The meaning of role modelling in moral and character education
Can virtue be measured?
Entangled phronesis and the four causes of emulation
Considering the Purposes of Moral Education with Evidence in Neuroscience
Negotiating masculine identities
The educational salience of emulation as a moral virtue
The possibilities and limits of learning from immoral role models
The moral psychology of emulation through entangled phronesis
Toward a Critical-Sentimental Orientation in Human Rights Education
Designing a Method of Moral Education Based on an Integrated Approach to Moral Judgment
Contributions of moral education lectures and moral discussion in Hong Kong secondary schools
Dodgeball
A Habit of Social Action
Can We Teach Justified Anger
Virtue through Challenge
What we can learn from extreme moral exemplars
Close Engagements of a Collegial Kind
Habituation
Educating moral emotions
A Super Wild Story
Education and the Development of Reason (International Library of the Philosophy of Education Volume 8)
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics
The Virtues of Aristotle
Being Properly Affected
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Moral Discourse in a Pluralistic World
Virtues and Vices
Educating the Virtues
The Fabric of Character
| Citations per year | 1.05 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Highly cited | No |